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 This dissertation evaluates the rural pension program in China and the agricultural 
extension program in Malawi. Farmers’ private transfer behavior, retirement behavior, and 
learning failures are discussed in the three chapters respectively. 
 This first chapter studies the impact of a newly introduced rural pension program on the 
expenditure patterns of Chinese rural elders, with a special focus on the private transfer 
behaviors with their adult children. This is because we find that the pension program changes the 
rural elders' expenditure pattern only through its impact on transfers made to children, but not on 
consumption, saving or investment behaviors. Using a regression discontinuity design, we find 
that the rural pension has a significant crowding out effect on the old-age support from the 
elders' children, induces large transfers to children, and also triggers rural-to-urban migration of 
the children. In addition, we use a within-sibling model to show that the children who live in 
urban areas with more education and income tend to receive more transfers from their rural 
parents. The findings suggest that the rural pension program tends to substitute for the traditional 
old-age support provided by children, and also induces investment behaviors by stimulating 
transfers to children while leaving no significant impact on rural elders' welfare in its early phase. 
 The retirement behavior of farmers has received less attention compared to that of the 
urban laborers, because farmers usually do not have mandatory retirement ages or formal 
pension coverage, especially in the developing countries. The New Rural Pension Program 
(NRPP) in China provides an opportunity to study the heterogeneous retirement decisions of 
farmers, whose labor supply patterns can be depicted as ``ceaseless toil'' but lack a model that 
summarizes the key determinants of their retirement. The second chapter proposes a retirement 
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model that relates farmers' wealth, health assets and sick time to their retirement decisions. This 
model explains the puzzling empirical observation that wealthier farmers are less likely to retire 
after receiving the pension compared to the poorer farmers. The findings suggest that less 
wealthy farmers tend to drop off labor markets due to credit constraints and lack of investment in 
their health assets. Further pension policy reforms might prioritize health benefits and access to 
credit, in order to prevent the farmers from being trapped by poor health and credit constraints. 
 There are multitude of approaches and modalities in delivering useful information to rural 
communities. However, there is limited evidence regarding the information efficiency of these 
modalities, and the mechanism through which the potential information loss operates in the 
agricultural extension system. In the third chapter, we assess information efficiency along the 
knowledge transmission chain from researchers to agricultural extension agents (EAs) to lead 
farmers (LFs) to other farmers. By asking the same set of questions about a fairly well known 
technology, pit planting, we construct a measure of knowledge at each node of the knowledge 
transmission chain. Evidence shows that the majority of information loss happens at the 
Researcher-EA link and EA-to-LF link, and that the loss is potentially caused by teaching 
failures or selective attention and learning of both EAs and LFs to all important details of the 
technology. Results highlight the need for greater emphasis during training and learning on key 
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Chapter 1: No Country for Old Men? Pension-induced Private Transfer Behavior in Rural
China
Abstract This article studies the impact of a newly introduced rural pension program on the
expenditure patterns of Chinese rural elders, with a special focus on the private transfer behaviors
with their adult children. This is because we find that the pension program changes the rural elders’
expenditure pattern only through its impact on transfers made to children, but not on consumption,
saving or investment behaviors. Using a regression discontinuity design, we find that the rural
pension has a significant crowding out effect on the old-age support from the elders’ children,
induces large transfers to children, and also triggers rural-to-urban migration of the children. In
addition, we use a within-sibling model to show that the children who live in urban areas with more
education and income tend to receive more transfers from their rural parents. The findings suggest
that the rural pension program tends to substitute for the traditional old-age support provided by
children, and also induces investment behaviors by stimulating transfers to children while leaving
no significant impact on rural elders’ welfare in its early phase.
1.1 Introduction
Provision of old-age support is becoming one of the biggest social and economic challenges for
the East Asian countries (Hinz et al., 2012). As inequality usually goes hand in hand with economic
development (Kuznets, 1955; Robinson, 1976), many rapidly aging developing countries will find
the most severe old-age poverty conditions in their rural areas. China, as the most populous country
in the world with more than 600 million people living in rural areas, has the potential to exert a
major influence on many other developing countries through its pension policy. In 2009, China
pioneered with the New Rural Pension Program (NRPP) to tackle the rapid aging challenge in rural
areas. We evaluate the impact of NRPP on the rural elders’ expenditure patterns that are directly
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related to their welfare. Besides consumption, saving and investment, we focus on private transfer
behaviors to see whether the public transfer crowds out the traditional old-age support provided by
children, and also to discuss the implications of private transfers for rural development.
We find that the introduction of NRPP did not have significant impact on the rural elders’
consumption, saving and productive investment behaviors. NRPP crowds out the private transfers
made to the elders from their adult children, on both the extensive and intensive margins. We also
find evidence that the elders tended to increase largely the amount of transfers to their children
upon receiving benefits from NRPP, and these transfers potentially facilitated more rural-to-urban
migration. In addition, children who lived in urban areas, who had higher levels of education,
and who had higher income tended to receive more of their parents’ transfers. This observation is
consistent with an investment motive of the rural elders who sought higher returns to investment
in the urban areas through their children, instead of investing in agricultural production in the rural
areas. The long-term consequences of these transfers are beyond the scope of this study due to data
limitations, but within the short-term, part of the NRPP benefits leaked out of the rural areas and
were unlikely to supplement rural development.
The rest of the article is organized as follows: Section 1.2 briefly reviews the related literature;
Section 1.3 describes the New Rural Pension Program in China; Section 1.4 discusses theoretical
models of private transfers; Section 1.5 presents the empirical models and major econometric is-
sues; Section 1.6 introduces the data; Section 1.7 shows empirical findings; Section 1.8 discusses
the policy implications, and concludes.
1.2 Literature Review
The development literature has emphasized the importance of understanding the interaction be-
tween public transfer programs and private transfer behaviors in the extended family. For example,
policy makers might be concerned about whether the implementation of a public transfer program
is merely replacing an existing private safety net. If public transfers are substitutes for these private
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transfers, despite the distributive effects, the administrative costs of the public transfer programs
are creating dead weight loss for the economy as a whole (Becker, 1974; 1981). Cox (1987) further
points out that the degree of the substitution between public and private transfers depends on the
motives for private transfers (see Cox and Fafchamps 2007 for a review). If private transfers are
made out of an exchange motive, then public transfers are not likely to substitute for these pri-
vate transactions. However, if altruistic motives drive the transfers, then private efforts would be
largely crowded out. Such crowding out effects occurred in many countries, such as South Africa
(Maitra and Ray, 2003; Jensen, 2004), Korea (Jung et al., 2015) and Mexico (Juarez, 2009). How-
ever, the existing studies about private transfers between Chinese adult children and their elderly
parents provided mixed evidence about whether a public pension will crowd out the private trans-
fers from children to parents. Some have suggested that it could be very unlikely that the upward
intergenerational transfers will be crowded out by a public pension system, because the upward
inter-generational transfers are largely based on an exchange motive. For example, elder parents
can take care of their grandchildren and receive transfers from their children in exchange for this
service. Another example of an exchange motive is children repaying their parents for the educa-
tional investment that they received early in life. Nevertheless, Akay et al. (2014) showed that the
remittances sent by the rural-to-urban migrants were mostly based on the altruistic motive, because
the majority of the senders derived positive self-reported utility by sending remittances when their
left-behind families had lower income levels. However, Akay et al. (2014) did not focus on the
private transfers made to the elderly parents. Thus, NRPP offers an unique opportunity to study
this empirical question of whether public transfers will crowd out the traditional old-age support
from children in China.
Compared to the literature that examines private transfers received by the elders, very few stud-
ies have looked at transfer decisions made by the elders themselves, especially in the developing
countries where the rural elders are considered to be much more vulnerable to poverty than the
3
younger generation. However, the fruitful literature on the expansion of the South African old-age
pension can elucidate the impact of the cash transfer programs on the recipients’ extended fam-
ily. Studies indicated that old-age pensions helped improve the nutritional status of grandchildren
(Duflo, 2000; 2003), relaxed the credit constraints for the household to send migrants for better
employment opportunities (Ardington et al., 2009), decreased the labor supply of the prime-age
children who are residing with the pension receipients (Bertrand et al., 2003), and also encouraged
educational investment for grandchildren (Edmonds, 2005). Although none of these studies have
used data on the actual transfers made to the other family members, the studies showed that pri-
vate transfers enabled an important part of the pension receivers’ expenditure. However, we would
not expect the impact of NRPP to be the same as the pension program in South Africa, because
the benefit level in South Africa was about twice the rural median income (Duflo, 2003), whereas
NRPP only offered about 10 percent of rural median income.
In addition to private transfers made to other family members, consumption, productive invest-
ment and financial investment generally constitute the rest of the household expenditures. Jung et
al. (2015) found that Korean old-age pensions did not increase the elders’ total expenditures or
food expenditures because the expansion of the public pensions largely crowded out the private
transfers from adult children and/or own siblings. However, Jung et al. (2015) did not focus on the
rural areas, and GDP per capita in South Korea was almost three times higher than that in China.
Therefore, China may not experience the same crowding out effects as happened in Korea. De
Brauw and Roselle (2008) and Zhu et al. (2014) found no impact of remittances from migrant
children on the elders’ savings and productive investment behaviors. This could be explained by
the argument that the migrant network might substitute for precautionary saving (Giles and Yoo,
2007). To the extent that remittances and old-age pensions are substitutes, one might expect little
impact of old-age pensions on savings and productive investment.
4
1.3 The New Rural Pension Program (NRPP) in China
Aging has been posing serious social and economic challenges, especially for the developing
countries that are growing old rapidly without being rich enough to provide for the old. Tens of
millions of older Chinese have been struggling with poverty as their children flee villages to cities.
Rapid aging and an increasing dependency ratio due to the one-child policy, as well as the recent
trend of rural-to-urban migration as a result of urbanization1, have frayed the ties that once bound
the nation’s families together. The left-behind elders have to live off their own labor and remittances
from their migrant children.
Before the implementation of the NRPP, the old Rural Pension Program, in place from 1987 to
2008, was an unsubsidized individual contribution account system. However, the participation rate
was extremely low, which lead to insufficient pension funds that could barely insure the promised
benefits for the rural elderly. In 1999, the rural population that had participated in the old pension
program started to shrink.
In fighting against increasing old-age poverty in the rural areas, China launched the NRPP
in 2009, which covered more than 300 million Chinese by the end of 2012. Unlike the pension
programs in the developed areas, the NRPP was a cash transfer program, in which the conditions
were minimal: being registered as rural residents2, and age 60 or above. The NRPP aimed at an
universal coverage of formal and informal workers in rural China. By the end of 2012, the central
government and the local governments had invested more than 232 billion RMB ( about 40 billion
USD) in the pension fund, and all 2853 counties in China had implemented the NRPP.
The pension fund consisted of three parts: an individual contribution account, local government
subsidy, and central government subsidy. According to the guidance released by the State Council
of China, individuals could choose from five basic categories of individual premium: 100, 200,
1The proportion of urban residents in China increased from 17.4% in 1978 to 41.8% in 2005 (NBS, 2006)
2The Chinese Hukou system, which is the population registration system, abolished its differentiation between
agricultural and non-agricultural households, but it could still indicate the type of area that a household lives in.
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300, 400 and 500 RMB per year per person1. Individual accounts were designed to be actuarially
fair. A local government could introducemore categories to adjust for increases in the cost of living,
and the more the individuals contributed to their accounts, the more subsidies local governments
paid. Pensioners receive payment from both the individual account and the basic pension benefit,
where the latter was subsidized by the central government. The average benefit level was about
700 RMB per year, which was roughly 10% of the median annual individual income in the rural
area.
All rural residents aged 16 or above who were not enrolled in the urban basic pension program
could enroll in NRPP voluntarily. Participants below age 45 were required to contribute at least 15
years to become eligible for pension payment upon reaching age 60. However, according to the
State Council, those aged between 45 and 60 had no required minimum years of contribution, and
were only encouraged to contribute more to meet the shortfall in contributions to their account over
their remaining years before age 60. Most people aged 55 to 60 waited until age 60 to receive the
free basic pension offered by the central government without any contribution to the individual ac-
count (Chen andWang 2014). The pension payments were non-means tested, and non-contributory
to anyone aged 60 or above by the local rollout time of NRPP. Elders who were above age 60 were
not required to contribute to the pension fund.
1.4 Theoretical Models
In this section, we present the formal models and their implications of the existing private trans-
fer theories, and further discuss the nuances between these previous theories and our hypothesis of
the investment motive of private transfers.
1The 100 RMB option was the most popular choice (Lei et al. 2011). The average replacement rates of the five
premium choices for a median earner who enrolled at the earliest possible age were 18.03%, 21.24%, 24.45%, 27.66%,
30.87%, respectively ranging from 100RMB to 500RMB. These replacement rates were still much lower than the ones
for a median earner who enrolled in the urban pension program in China (79%) or the old-age pension in the US (53%)
according to the OECD reports (www.data.oecd.org/pension).
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1.4.1 Altruism
The Beckerian model of altruism (Becker, 1974; 1981) pioneers in explaining the private trans-
fer behaviors within the family. The simplest version of this model has one effectively1 altruistic
donor and one passive recipient. The model implies that the transfers to the recipient are negatively
correlated with the changes in the recipient’s income.
In the multi-person altruism model, there is a parent who contributes to several selfish children
or other selfish beneficiaries. His/her utility function could be written as
Up = U(Zp, Z1, ..., Zk)
where p denotes parents and 1 through k denote the beneficiaries. Throughout this paper, we assume
that the parents care equally for each of their children conditioning on gender2; parents’ utility
function U is quasi-concave so that the indifference curves take normal shape; U ′ > 0, U ′′ < 0. Zi




Ti = Ip (1)
where Ti represents the transfers to the ith beneficiary, and I is the income of the parents. Because





Zi = Ip +
k∑
i=1
Ii = Sp (3)
1This means that the altruism will result in different consumption pattern of the person compared to the case where
the person is not altruistic.
2This is because son-preference is so prevalent in rural China.
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where i, j = p, 1, ..., k (4)
In equilibrium, we should observe that the marginal utilities of consumption are equalized
among all the children. With the equal concern assumption and U ′′ < 0, condition (4) will im-
ply that conditioning on positive transfers from the elder parents to all children, the parents will
tend to transfer more to the children who have lower status quo consumption levels.
1.4.2 Exchange
Cox (1987) formalizes the exchange motive of private transfers. Embedded in the altruism
model, the exchange model incorporates services from the child as an argument in the donor’s
utility function
Up = U(Zp, s, V (Zk, s)) (5)
where Up denotes the parent’s utility; Zp and Zk represent consumption of the parent and child,
respectively; s is the service provided by the child, and V is the child’s utility function in which
∂V
∂s
< 0. The budget constraints are
Zp ≤ Ip − T (6)
and
Zk ≤ Ik + T (7)
where Ip and Ik are income of the parent and child, respectively; and T is the transfer. When there
is an increase in the recipient’s income, the comparative statics (Cox, 1987) show that the transfer
amount, conditioning on making positive transfers, will increase under the assumption that the
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which contradicts the prediction made by the altruism model. The intuition is that when the service
provided by the recipient is not easily substitutable in the market, the increase in the recipient’s
income does not crowd out the private transfers. Sincewe aremore concernedwith downward inter-
generational transfers, the simplest empirical test would be to see if the child who provides more
services receives more transfers from the parents. However, our results show that the coefficient
on the child service proxy, which is number of contact days, is not positive nor significant in the
equation exploring transfers received by children. As a further test for the exchange motive, we
construct a binary variable that indicates whether the child is expected to provide old-age support.
We find that even after controlling for this variable that proxies a “quid pro quo” in the future,
child education, child income and child urban residence status are still positive and significant in
explaining children’s transfers received from their parents. This observation motivates the model in
the next section that better explains why parents choose to transfer more to their better-off children.
1.4.3 Investment
We propose an investment model of private transfers, and use it to reconcile the observed down-
ward inter-generational transfer patterns. The investment model of transfer that we use here is based
on the Separable Earnings Transfer (SET)model in the literature of parental investment in children’s
education (Behrman et. al, 1982). The SET model looks at how parents allocate resources among
children to build up their human capital. However, our model analyzes how parents allocate re-
sources among children to maximize the wealth of the extended family while treating the attributes
of children as given. An additional difference between SET and our model is that the children in
1Mathematically, this means (ps
∂s
∂p > −1), which intuitively indicates that the service is not easily substitutable in
the market.
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the SET model are still in the process of obtaining education, whereas in our model, the children
are in their prime age and have already completed education. In our two-period investment model,
the elders maximize the following utility function:
Up = U(C
1











where the superscripts denote the time periods, Cp is the consumption of the parents, Ic1 through
Icn are children’s income, and β is a discounting factor. The preferences over consumption bundles
and the preferences over children’s income are separable in the sense that any choices that affect
children’s income distribution are independent of the parents’ consumption level. The parents will




T 1i ≤ I1p (10)










i ) where t = 1, 2 for i = 1, ..., n (12)
where T ti represents the parents’ transfers to child i at period t, in this model, the parents only make
the transfers to children at period 1, so that T 0 and T 2 are both zero; I tp is the parents’ income
at period t, φ denotes the proportion of income that each child transfers back to the parents. For
simplicity, we assume that each child cares about the parents equally, so that all childrenwill transfer
an equal proportion of their income to their parents. I tci is the income of the ith child at time t, and
the income potential function is given in equation (12), which indicates that child i’s income at
time t is bounded by the function of the genetic endowment Gi, the completed schooling Si, the
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residence area at time t Ati, the other time-variant factors that affect income X
t
i , and the transfers
from parents in the first period T t−1i . The children will take the transfers from their parents in the
previous period to make investments according to their innate ability, education, and investment
opportunities proxied by the residence area. Because the residence area of the child Ati is modeled
as a time-variant variable, this model includes the possibility that children engage in labor migration
supported by their parents’ transfers. This labor migration behavior could also be interpreted as an
investment behavior for the extended family.
To illustrate, we simplify to the situation where there are only two children in the extended fam-
ily. Parents care equally about each children so that the parents’ indifference curves are symmetric
with respect to the 45 degree line. Point A(B) shows the income potential if the parents devote all
the available resource to child 1 (child 2). In Figure 1.1, child 1 and child 2 have the same income
potential, thus, the income possibility frontier is symmetric with respect to the 45 degree line. In
this case, point C will be the optimal solution which lies on the 45 degree line where the transfer
amounts from parents are the same.
Figure 1.2 shows the case where the two children have different income potential. Even though
the parents care equally about the children, the transfer amount does not need to be the same to
each child. In the case where child 2 has more income potential as shown in Figure 1.2, C’ is the
optimal solution where the parents transfer more to child 2. Since the income potential function
takes children’s current status as variables, the investment motive model indicates that the more
educated child, as well as the child who lives in or migrates to the urban area will receive more
transfers from parents.
When the extended family already has migrant children that live in urban areas, the elders can
invest through their migrant children because they have more potential to achieve high returns. For
example, the migrant children can use the support from their parents to engage in entrepreneurship,
which will enable these migrant children to further incorporate into the urban economy. We test
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this hypothesis with a within-sibling model that controls for parental characteristics, and see if the
children with more income potential tend to receive more transfers from parents, and the results
are shown in section 1.7.2. In section 1.7.3, we test another investment behavior that aligns with
the investment model of the extended family. For the families that do not have migrant children
yet, the investment model implies that they would tend to send out children for labor migration.
We can test this implication to see whether receiving NRPP induces labor migration of the elders’
children. However, it is a limitation of this article that we can not further test whether the transfers
or induced labor migration will result in any returns to the elders in the long-term, because we only
observe two waves of data that are two years apart.
1.5 Empirical Model and Econometric Issues
1.5.1 Regression Discontinuity Design
To estimate the causal effect of NRPP on the private transfers and other expenditure components
of the Chinese rural elders, we use a fuzzy regression discontinuity design (RDD), made possible
by the arbitrary age eligibility threshold of the NRPP. We prefer RDD over the other econometric
methods because RDD allows us to make causal inferences around a narrow age range where we do
not need to worry much about the life-cycle changes in the outcome variables of interest. However,
this method also limits the external validity of our analysis, so that we can only make inferences
around the pension eligibility age, which is 60. Because of incomplete compliance, we use a fuzzy
regression discontinuity design.
Our goal is to estimate the discontinuous changes in transfer behaviors, consumption, sav-
ing and investment across the eligibility threshold. Assuming that the unobserved variables are
a smooth function of the running variable, this change reflects the causal effect of the NRPP. Be-
cause the running variable is discrete, it is impossible to observe behaviors that are arbitrarily close
to the threshold on both sides. This means that we have to extrapolate the trend of the outcome
12
variables away from the threshold. Potentially, this extrapolation makes our results sensitive to the
functional form of the running variable. In order to show robustness, we follow Lee and Lemieux
(2010) and use two different functional forms. The first specification is a nonparametric local linear
regression, which estimates the following model using triangular weights to give higher weight to
observations that are closer to the threshold
Yict = β0 + β1Ri + β2Pi + β3RiPi + β4Xi + αc + γt + εict (13)
In equation 13, Yict denotes the outcome variable for household i, which resides in county c at
year t. Ri is the running variable, which is age. Pi is a binary indicator of whether the household
head has already received pension benefits from NRPP.Xi contains the demographic control vari-
ables. αc is a community fixed effect, γt is a year fixed effects, and εict is the idiosyncratic error.
Because the pension-receiving status Pi might be endogenous due to household-specific charac-
teristics, we construct a binary variable which indicates whether the household head is age 60 and
above at the time of the survey and use it as an instrument for the variable Pi. Because the central
government arbitrarily chose the policy eligibility rule, it is exogenous to the pension-receiving
status.
The second specification is a regression that flexibly controls for quadratic trends on both sides
of the threshold:
Yict = β0 + β1Ri + β2R
2
i + β3Pi + β4RiPi + β5R
2
iPi + αc + γt + εict (14)
In both specifications, the coefficient of Pi, which is the pension-receiving status, gives the
RDD estimate. Our baseline specification uses a triangular kernel with a bandwidth of 6. With
the main results, we present bias corrected, optimal bandwidth results as suggested by Imbens and
Kalyanaraman (2011). We also perform robustness tests, varying the bandwidths. The unit of
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observation is the household-year. Standard errors are clustered at the county level to take care of
the potential serial correlation within a county.
1.5.2 Within Sibling Model
In order to further understand the private transfer behaviors between the rural elderly parents
and their children, we build an empirical within-sibling model of transfers sent to the children as
a function of children’s characteristics. We treat the rural elderly as the decision makers, who take
the children’s charateristics as given and model their decisions of how much to transfer to their
children in the following way:
Yip =β0 + β1Edui + β2Servicei + β3Incomei + β4Worki + β5HaveChildreni+




i + β10Malei + β11FirstBorni+
β12LastBorni + γp + εi
(15)
where Yip is the transfer sent to child i by parents p; Edui denotes child i’s completed education
1,
which can reflect the earnings potential in the labor market, as well as cognitive ability that is im-
portant in making informative investment decisions; Servicei is proxied by the number of contact
or visit days of child i, and the literature on the motives of private transfers has been using the
number of contact days as a proxy for “child services” that are not easily substitutable in the mar-
ket; Incomei is child i’s annual total income that the child received the year prior to the survey,
which directly reflects the living circumstances that the child is in, Worki is whether child i is
working,HaveChildreni shows if child i has children; Urbani takes value one if the elder’s child




i are supposed to capture the potential non-linear effect of
child age; Malei takes value 1 if the child is male; FirstBorni and LastBorni are both binary
1Note that these children in the sample are all adults who have completed their education.
2Out of the 2276 adult children in the sample, 502 children are living in the urban area.
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indicators of birth order, we include these variables because according to the Chinese culture, the
first-born child is supposed to take more family responsibilities than the rest of the children and
the youngest child in the family is usually spoiled by the parents1; γp denotes the parents’ fixed
effects, εi is the idiosyncratic error term. By controlling for parents’ fixed effects we are only using
variations within siblings to estimate coefficients, purging away the endogeneity issues raised by
the differences across parents.
1.6 Data
The data used in this study came from the China Health and Retirement Longitudinal Study
(CHARLS), which aimed to collect a high quality nationally representative sample of Chinese res-
idents ages 45 and older. The national sample included a baseline wave in 2011 and a follow-up
wave in 2013. About 10,000 households and 17,500 individuals in 150 counties/districts and 450
villages were included in the survey. The CHARLS data was based on the Health and Retire-
ment Study (HRS) in the US and was comparable to the surveys such as the English Longitudinal
Study of Aging, as well as the Survey of Health, Aging and Retirement in Europe. The CHARLS
questionnaire included information on demographics, family structure and transfers, health status,
work history, pension, consumption and assets acquisition. The sample consisted of observations
from both 2011 and 2013. Because the survey sample was expanded in the second wave, there
were cross-sectional observations that were not part of the first wave sample. In our analysis, 28%
of the whole sample consisted of panel observations, and 72% of the whole sample consisted of
cross-sectional observations, of which 22% came from 2011 and 78% comes from 2013. In order
to control for potential serial correlation of observations within communities2, we clustered the
observations at the community level. We also provided results clustering at the individual level in
1The omitted category is that the child is neither born the first, or the last.
2We also provide results clustering at the individual level in the appendix. We find that when we cluster at the
individual level, the standard errors become smaller, which indicates that in addition to serial correlation within indi-
viduals over time, there are positive correlations among individuals in the same community, which makes clustering
on the community level a safter specification.
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the appendix. We found that when we clustered at the individual level, the standard errors became
smaller, which indicated that in addition to serial correlation within individuals over time, there
were positive correlations among individuals in the same community, which made clustering on
the community level a more conservative (preferred) specification.
The sample used for estimation included only the rural families that had at least one adult child.
Table 1.1 provides the summary statistics. The education levels for the rural elders are very lowwith
only about four years on average. As high as 80% of these individuals were still working, which
reflected the depiction of “endless toil” in the labor supply literature on Chinese rural elders (Davis,
1991). Thirty-eight percent of the elders in the sample had been receiving NRPP benefits. Private
transfers were defined to be the transfers sent or received by the elder couple in the household.
The survey question asked was “Have you or your spouse received transfers from your children
who are not living with you in the last year? If yes, what was the amount?” The private transfers
included both monetary and in-kind supports. The transfer behaviors were very prevalent among
rural Chinese, and the amount of transfers was large relative to the elders’ annual income. About
80 percent of the children had sent transfers to their parents, and about 23 percent of the elder
parents had sent transfers to their children. In the CHARLS sample, only about 16 percent of the
rural elders were living with their adult children, and the proportion of households that had migrant
children was about 85 percent, which largely reflected the trend of rural-to-urban migration and the
phenomenon of “left-behind elders”. Elders’ families included about 3 children, with 96 percent of
the elder parents having more than 2 children, which indicated that this generation of rural elders
was only slightly affected by the one-child policy. Huang et al. (2015) also showed that at the




1.7.1 Regression discontinuity results
We first examine whether the assumptions that underlie the regression discontinuity method
hold. Figure 1.3 shows the distribution of the running variable, which indicates that there is some
age heaping at age 59, which is counterintuitive if pensions start at 60. We need to rule out the
possibility that the households can manipulate their registration ages, which can affect their pension
receiving status. To check this, we use the density discontinuity test proposed by Cattaneo et al.
(2016) to see if there is manipulation of the running variable. The null hypothesis is that the density
of the age distribution is smooth around the age threshold, which is 60. The test statistic is -0.897
with a P-value of 0.370, so that we cannot reject the null hypothesis, which indicates that there is
no significant manipulation of the running variable. The age distribution is smooth around age 60.
Not all the rural elders who are eligible have received the pension benefits, which implies in-
complete compliance. One reason for this deviation from the official policies set by the state council
is that the central government requires the local governments to subsidize at least 30 Yuan per per-
son per year, which could be a burden if the elders’ prime-age children do not participate in the
pension programs. Figure 1.4 shows the incomplete compliance rate, which motivates the fuzzy
regression discontinuity design.
Another concern about the RD design is whether the identifying assumptions hold, which in-
clude the smoothness of the observable characteristics of the household across the eligibility thresh-
old. If this assumption holds, we should not observe any discontinuities for the household char-
acteristics around the cutoff age. Figure 1.5 indicates that observable characteristics are smooth
across the eligibility threshold.
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1.7.1.1 Transfers Received by the Rural Elders
Figure 1.6 plots the probability of receiving transfers from children and the actual amount of
transfers received against the elder parent’s age. The scatter dots are the means of the outcome
variable by each age group; the solid curves represent the quadratic fits on both sides of the age
eligibility threshold; the dashed curves give the nonparametric local linear fits. The graphs show
that both the probability of receiving from children, and the actual amount of transfer received de-
crease sharply across age 60, which is the age threshold for receiving pension benefits from NRPP.
According to the corresponding RD results in Table 1.2, for the Chinese rural elders who are close
to age 60, receiving the pension benefits from NRPP reduces the probability of receiving transfers
from children by 23.8%. Also, for those who have been receiving transfers from their children, the
amount transferred decreased significantly, too. These results indicate that the introduction of the
NRPP has significantly crowded out the private transfers that the rural elders have been receiving
from their adult children. These findings contradict the previous results shown in the literature on
the transfer behaviors in rural China, where the authors believed that large transfer programs in
rural China were not likely to crowd out the private transfers (Secondi 1997; Cai et al. 2012).
1.7.1.2 Transfers Sent from the Rural Elders
Figure 1.7 shows the plots of the probability and the actual amounts of transfers sent from the
rural elders to their children. The graphs indicate that the amount of transfers sent to children
increases sharply when the elders start to receive benefits from the NRPP. For the probability of
sending transfers, the figure indicates an increase around the pension eligible age, but the discon-
tinuity is not as clear as in the transfer amount figure. The corresponding RD results are shown
in Table 1.3. Even though the point estimate of the NRPP impact on the probability of sending
transfers is positive, it is not statistically different from zero. This implies that the income effect of
NRPP does not increase very much the extensive margin of sending transfers to children. However,
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NRPP does have a large impact on the amount of transfers sent to children for those who have been
sending transfers. Rural elders who are around age sixty increase their transfer to children by about
5067 RMB upon receiving the pension benefits from NRPP. We also observe that this effect size
is more than one hundred percent when compared with the mean transfer amount in the sample.
We interpret this result as the elders are transferring according to their permanent income, because
the pension benefits result in a steady stream of income starting from age 60. After comparing the
wealth level of the elders who have been transferring to their children and who have not,1, we find
that the former elders are wealthier than the latter ones. It helps to explain why the transferring
elder parents are not so credit-constrained. However, this huge impact size is still puzzling for the
reason that NRPP offers an average benefit that is only about 10% of the median income, which
might not be able to induce such a large transfer elasticity. We can observe from Figure 1.7 that
the transfer amount falls off quickly with age, which indicates that the transfers made by the elder
parents are not likely to be sustainable. Can the altruism motivation alone explain the large transfer
elasticity of income? Additionally, in the previous section, the results on the transfers received by
the elders have shown that the private transfers from children are largely crowded out by the NRPP,
so the increment in transfers to children might not simply be a result of the income effects from
the NRPP. To find out the motivation behind these transfer behaviors, we further analyze the other
major components of household expenditure in section 1.7.1.3, and also the relationship between
the characteristics of the elders’ adult children and the amount of transfers the children received in
section 1.7.2.
1.7.1.3 Impact of NRPP on Consumption, Saving and Investment
Table 1.4 shows the impact of NRPP on the other major components of the household expendi-
tures. We categorize household consumption into food, clothes, household goods and services,
1The t-test compares the financial assets of the elder parents who have been transferring to their children versus who
do not; the former elders hold an average of 13271.81 Yuan as total financial assets, whereas the latter hold 7414.47
Yuan; the difference is statistically significant at 1 percent level.
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medical expenses, durable goods, productive assets including the number of productive assets
owned and the current value of the productive assets, and financial assets including savings, loans
and debts. We use the same sample and same econometric method as for the analyses on transfers.
The results indicate that the NRPP has no significant impact on the expenditure patterns of the rural
elders. Also, the insignificant results for capital investments are in line with the previous studies
on rural Chinese households (De Brauw and Roselle, 2008; Zhu et al., 2014).
However, as Alderman and Ymtsov (2014) point out in their literature review of rural household
investment behaviors, cash transfer programs have significant impacts on productive investment
in many developing countries around the world. Why are rural Chinese households so reluctant
to invest in productive investments, but at the same time prone to transferring to children? We
further analyze in the section 1.7.2 whether transfers to children can be understood as a substitute
for investment in rural China.
1.7.1.4 Robustness Checks
As robustness checks, we examine results when we vary the bandwidth from 4 to 8. The results
in Table 1.5 indicate that changing the bandwidth does not affect the statistical significance of
the estimated coefficients much. However, the magnitude of coefficients tends to decrease as the
bandwidth becomes larger. This is because transfer behaviors are very sensitive to the elder’s
age, and the transfers are more likely to flow from adult children to elder parents as they age.
When we include individuals from a wider age range, the pension effects tend to be mixed with
the age effects, and the coefficients tend to be close to zero. This is also the reason why we use
RD approach to identify this pension impact. By sacrificing some external validity and focusing
on identifying pension effect around the age cutoff, we can isolate pension effects from age effects.
For the same identification concerns, we prefer RD results over the panel method results. The way
that individual fixed-effects model puts equal weights on all age-range observations tend to find
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less accurate estimate around the cutoff. RD approach improves on this aspect, because RD puts
more weights near the cutoff. These individual fixed-effects model results using a panel of 896
individuals can be found in the appendix Table A.1.
Further more, face the tradeoff between including more observations to increase statistical
power, and restricting identification close to the age cutoff. To maintain the statistical power, we
pool the two waves of data for our major results. As another robustness check, we use 2013 data
only, and the results are shown in Appendix Table A.2 and Table A.3. We observe the magnitude
of the coefficients decreases compared to the main results in Table 1.2 and Table 1.3. This could
be because we lose some statistical power by including much fewer observations. The significance
of the coefficients remains to support the major arguments in the paper.
The results of falsification tests that we performed at other “pseudo-thresholds” where NRPP
eligibility does not change suggest that our RD approach is valid. When the cutoff is defined at age
59 and at age 61, none of the results for the dependent variables are statistically significant (Table
1.6). The behavior change is well defined at age 60.
1.7.2 Fixed Effect Regression Results – Private Transfers to Adult Children
Table 1.7 shows the analyses of the determinants of the amount of transfers sent to the elders’
children. Three samples of the rural elders’ children are used for estimation in Table 1.7: the
specifications (1) and (2) use a sample of adult children whose parents have more than one adult
child1; the sample used for specification (3) includes all male adult children in the households
that have more than one adult son; the sample used for specification (4) includes all female adult
children in the households that have more than one adult daughter.
Specification (1) in Table 1.7 shows the OLS regression of the amount of transfers sent to each
child on the child’s characteristics. The results show that child education, expectations by parents
1In other words, the adult children in this sample have at least one adult sibling.
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to provide old-age support, income, urban status and being male are all positively correlated with
the transfers received by the children; only being married is negatively correlated with transfers
received. However, one might suspect that some household-specific characteristics, especially the
parents’ characteristics, could be endogenously related to children’s characteristics, and the amount
of transfers to children. For example, parents in one family might care more about their children
than the parents in another family, which leads to a spurious relationship between children’s educa-
tion and transfers sent to children. To overcome this endogeneity issue, we estimate a within-family
regression in which the family fixed-effects are used. This means that only the deviations from the
familymean are used in the regression, and the unmeasured time-invariant family characteristics are
controlled. Specification (2) in Table 1.7 shows the within-sibling family fixed effects regression.
After controlling for the family-specific effects, the coefficients of the child’s education, income,
urban status and male indicator remain significantly positive. The positive and strongly significant
point estimate for male child indicator aligns with the deeply rooted son-preference in rural China.
However, the variables expectation by parents to provide old-age support, and the binary indicator
of being married becomes insignificant in the within-sibling specification. This result indicates that
after controlling for parents-specific fixed effects, the exchange motive proxied by the number of
contact days and expectations of old-age support does not explain much about the transfers sent by
the rural elder parents to their children.
Because the transfer behaviors could be very different across gender of children, we further
stratify the sample by gender and look at how transfers are allocated within sons and within daugh-
ters. Specification (3) in Table 1.7 shows the within-sibling regression with sons excluding daugh-
ters in the family where there are at least two sons. When we compare the sons in the family, child
income loses its significance, and the rest of the estimates are consistent with those in specification
(2). Specification (4) presents the results for within-daughters analysis. The results are mostly
consistent with those in specification (2), except that the child education variable losses its signif-
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icance and the point estimate is much smaller compared to the one in the sons’ specification. In
addition, the variables expectation of old-age support and child income become significant. The
results indicate that the exchange motive is more likely to explain transfer behaviors of parents with
their daughters than sons, and the wealth potential of the daughters might be more closely related
to the characteristics of the sons-in-law than the daughters’ human capital.
To summarize, the elder parents tend to transfer more to the better-off children who are living
in the urban area1, who are sons that have higher level of education and also daughters who have
more income and are expected to be the parents’ old-age support provider. Also, the coefficients in
the within daughters analysis have much smaller magnitudes compared to those in the sample with
sons. This implies both the existence of sonpreferences and that daughters have less bargaining
power in their families than their brothers.
The above results, especially the ones in the within-siblings and the within-sons specifications
can not be easily rationalized by the existing, well-studied motives for private transfers. If the
transfers are out of altruism, then the elder parents should compensate the worse-off children in the
family instead of favoring the better-off children. If the transfers are based on the exchange motive,
then the proxy for children’s service to parents, which is “Number of Contact Days” in the analysis,
and the variable expected provider of old-age support should be positive and significant. In order to
rationalize the elder parents’ transfer behavior, we hypothesize that the transfers are made with an
investment motive. The development literature emphasizes that agrarian households are engaged
in both consumption and investment/production decisions (Eswaran and Kotwal 1986, Singh et al.
1986, Benjamin 1992). Because we observe that the positive income shock from the rural pension
only affects transfer behaviors but not consumption, investment, or other types of expenditure, the
transfer to children might have become a substitute for consumption or investment behavior. Given
1The rural-urban disparity in living conditions is quite large in China. As a result, living in urban area is usually
associated with better job opportunities and higher income.
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the evidence in this section, the private transfers to well-educated and urban sons are more likely to
substitute for investment in the local agrarian economy, because the childrenwho aremore educated
or living in the urban area have better opportunity to maximize the returns to this investment.
Due to the limited time-span of our data, we can not further test the long-term welfare impact
of these transfers. However, it is clear that in the short-term, part of the NRPP benefits will leak out
of the rural areas. In our sample, 23% of the rural elders make positive transfers to their children,
and 85% of the rural elders have children who live in the urban area. In section 1.7.1.2, we have
shown that the change in transfers almost doubled the existing mean transfer amount. If we assume
all the incremental transfers go to the urban children, a rough calculation would indicate that for
every Chinese Yuan that is distributed through NRPP, about 0.71 Chinese Yuan 1 will be relocated
to the urban area through private transfers.
1.7.3 Whether NRPP Induces Labor Migration of Rural Elders’ Children
Another behavior that aligns with the investment model is that the elders will tend to send
out children for labor migration upon receiving NRPP benefits. Also, we would like to discover
whether there is any mechanism such as supporting labor migration that underlies the behavior of
transferring to children. We define migrant children as the children who live in urban areas that
belong to different city areas than their parents. Table 1.8 shows the results of analyzing the impact
of NRPP on labor migration of the rural elders’ children. It shows that upon receiving NRPP
benefits, the probability of having migrant children significantly increases by about 26 percent,
even though the impact on the number of migrant children is not statistically significantly different
from zero. One explanation for this result is that the increment in probability of sending migrant
children comes from the families that do not have migrant children yet. For the households that do
have migrant children, sending another might not be worth the cost. The corresponding graphs are
11 * 0.23 * 0.85 * (5067/1397) = 0.71
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in Figure 1.8. Since we observed that almost 80 percent of the rural elders have migrant children,
the introduction of NRPP tends to allow the rest of the rural prime-aged children to follow the
rural-to-urban migration trend.
The results here are consistent with the findings in Ardington et al. (2009), where the South
African pension induces prime-age children of the pensioners to migrate for labor opportunities.
This finding also reconciles well with our previous finding that NRPP induces large transfers to
adult children. Even though we are not able to link the transfers made to children directly to either
existing migrant children or sending new migrant children, the results that the transfers will more
likely be going to urban children and triggermoremigration can bewell explained by the investment
motive of transfers. Moreover, unlike the generous South African pension that improves many
other welfare outcomes of the pensioners and also the extended family, it is worth noting that the
Chinese rural elders prioritize the transfers to children that potentially support their labor migration
over their own consumption and other forms of investment in rural areas.
1.8 Discussion and Conclusion
From the results in section 1.7.1.3, we show that the NRPP does not have significant impact
on the welfare of the rural elders in its early phase. However, we should be cautious that our
results can only be interpreted around the pension age threshold, which is age 60. We can explain
the insignificant welfare improvement with our findings on private transfer behaviors. We argue
that two factors have attenuated the welfare impact of the NRPP. First, the introduction of NRPP
largely crowds out the existing private transfers from the elders’ children. Thismeans that the public
transfer tends to substitute for the traditional ways to provide for the old in rural China. Second,
many rural elders (23% of the sample) increase their transfers to their children upon receivingNRPP
benefits, instead of consuming, saving or investing in the rural area.
We can explain this pension-induced transfer behavior with several potential mechanisms, all
of which could be interpreted with an investment motive that could substitute for traditional invest-
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ments in rural production. First, more than 80 percent of the rural elders who have migrant children
in the urban area can seek the higher returns to investment in the urban area through their children,
or strategically attach to their better-off children by making the transfers in order to obtain better
living conditions in the future. Second, for those who do not have migrant children yet, receiving
NRPP benefits tends to relax the credit constraint that previously prevents the prime-age children’s
labor migration. These observations also align with the well-understood two-stage theory of labor
migration (Todaro, 1969) that is essential for economic development. In the first stage, rural farmers
are lured by the higher expected income in the urban area and decide to migrate. The second stage
is about how to participate in the urban economy. The transfer responses of the rural elders can help
in both of the two stages. However, governments and non-governmental organizations that con-
sider using cash transfer to support the rural elders might want to be aware of the consequences of
these public transfers. For example, if their goals are using the public transfers to improve the rural
economy, or the migrant-receiving urban areas are already operating at overloaded capacity, these
old-age pension type of public transfers might not align with their initial intentions. We are limited
in our ability to measure the long-term welfare impact of these behaviors. At the current stage, we
do not have enough data to test whether the transfers made from rural elders or the pension-induced
labor migration of the children would eventually improve the welfare of the left-behind elders.
In addition to the impact evaluation of the NRPP, we have also shown that cash transfers to
eligible households can indirectly accrue to the better-off ineligible households that have better
investment ability and opportunities in the extended family. This effect operates through inter-
generational transfers. Even though cash transfer programs are known to also impact the ineligibles
within the local economy (Angelucci and De Giorgi, 2009), in an economy with large rural-urban
disparity and prevalent rural-to-urban migration such as China, the program impact is not limited
within the target geographic region or its local economy. Further analysis on the long-term wel-
fare impact of these “transfer investments” is needed, especially when new waves of data become
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available.
1.9 Figures and Tables
Figure 1.1 Transfer with an investment motive, homogeneous children
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Figure 1.2 Transfer with an investment motive, heterogeneous children
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Table 1.2 The Impact of NRPP on Transfers Received from Children
Specifications Probability Amount
Non-parametric linear, no control -0.238∗∗ -4123.162∗∗
(0.114) (2012.881)
Non-parametric linear, with control -0.231∗∗ -4532.414∗∗
(0.113) (2017.199)
Quadratic, no control -0.225∗∗ -10791.350∗∗
(0.110) (4759.914)
Quadratic, with control -0.223∗∗ -11274.791∗∗
(0.111) (4754.709)
Bias-corrected, optimal band-width -0.198∗ -8471.556∗∗
(0.117) (3798.121)
Control Mean 0.719 2947.861
Observations 2,648 2,648
Community FE yes yes
Rural sample from China Health and Retirement Longitudinal Study in 2011 and 2013.
Nonparametric local linear regressions use triangular weights with a bandwidth of 6.
Fuzzy regression discontinuity estimation as in equation (13) and (14).
Bias-corrected, optimal band-width specification uses STATA rdrobust CCT option
Control variables include household size, education and income of both the
senders and receivers of the transfers, and sex ratio of the transfer senders.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
33
Table 1.3 The Impact of NRPP on Transfers Sent to Children
Specifications Probability Amount
Non-parametric linear, no control 0.006 5067.216∗∗
(0.125) (2728.112)
Non-parametric linear, with control -0.018 4888.926∗∗
(0.073) (2715.617)
Quadratic, no control 0.046 8902.679∗
(0.126) (5458.874)
Quadratic, with control 0.046 8659.546∗
(0.255) (5432.196)
Bias-corrected, optimal band-width 0.058 4790.233∗∗
(0.109) (2117.356)
Control Mean 0.311 1397.243
Observations 2,648 2,648
Community FE yes yes
Rural sample from China Health and Retirement Longitudinal Study in 2011 and 2013.
Nonparametric local linear regressions use triangular weights with a bandwidth of 6.
Fuzzy regression discontinuity estimation as in equation (13) and (14).
Bias-corrected, optimal band-width specification uses STATA rdrobust CCT option
Control variables include household size, education and income of both the
senders and receivers of the transfers, and sex ratio of the transfer senders.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 1.5 Robustness Checks on Bandwidth Selection
Bandwidth Selection BW4 BW5 BW6 BW7 BW8
Specifications (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Probability of receiving -0.392∗ -0.287∗ -0.231∗∗ -0.192∗∗ -0.168∗∗
transfers from children (0.267) (0.154) (0.113) (0.091) (0.077)
Amount of transfers -11032.203∗∗ -6370.667∗∗ -4532.414∗∗ -3001.303∗ -2260.034∗
received from children (5364.781) (2842.793) (2017.199) (1535.290) (1253.703)
Probability of sending 0.071 -0.016 -0.018 -0.016 0.025
transfers to children (0.294) (0.164) (0.123) (0.101) (0.088)
Amount of transfers 13897.848∗ 6979.576∗∗ 4888.926∗∗ 3989.192∗∗ 3457.732∗∗
sent to children (7860.363) (3865.353) (2715.617) (2182.909) (1866.027)
Probability of sending 0.351 0.344∗∗ 0.277∗∗ 0.215∗∗ 0.180∗∗
migrant children (0.260) (0.162) (0.122) (0.098) (0.083)
Number of migrant children 0.688 0.613 0.505 0.426 0.390
(0.816) (0.517) (0.384) (0.309) (0.262)
Observations 1783 2265 2648 3016 3326
Community FE yes yes yes yes yes
Rural sample from China Health and Retirement Longitudinal Study in 2011 and 2013.
Nonparametric local linear regressions use triangular weights.
Fuzzy regression discontinuity estimation as in equation (13).
Control variables include household size, education and income of both the
senders and receivers of the transfers, and sex ratio of the transfer senders.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 1.6 Falsification Tests
Falsification cutoffs Cutoff at age 59 Cutoff at age 61
Specifications (1) (2)
Probability of receiving transfers from children -5.061 -0.004
(10.311) (0.055)
Amount of transfers received from children 80269.701 -905.408
(154944.109) (831.656)
Probability of sending transfers to children -2.927 0.010
(6.322) (0.055)
Amount of transfers sent to children -10021.896 667.643
(59357.044) (1274.437)
Probability of sending migrant children 4.243 0.018
(8.706) (0.044)
Number of migrant children 14.717 -0.097
(29.383) (0.150)
Observations 2640 2641
Community FE yes yes
Rural sample from China Health and Retirement Longitudinal Study in 2011 and 2013.
Nonparametric local linear regressions use triangular weights with bandwidth of 6.
Fuzzy regression discontinuity estimation as in equation (13).
Control variables include household size, education and income of both the
senders and receivers of the transfers, and sex ratio of the transfer senders.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 1.7 Determinants of Transfers Sent to Children
Transfers to Children
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Specifications OLS Within-Sibling Within-Sons Within-Daughters
Child Education 146.5∗∗∗ 150.9∗∗ 334.7∗∗∗ -4.8
(43.9) (65.5) (124.5) (28.3)
Number of Contact Days 0.1 -0.2 -0.9 0.1
(0.6) (0.7) (1.2) (0.4)
Expected by Parents to 272.6∗ 465.2 838.1 528.9∗∗
provide Old-age Support (149.1) (341.6) (868.0) (229.9)
Child Income 255.2∗∗∗ 254.1∗∗∗ 75.2 101.0∗∗
(54.9) (93.1) (145.3) (40.8)
Child Working Status 175.3 219.4 1236.9 129.3
(238.6) (315.5) (756.1) (117.2)
Child has children 124.8 449.1 -534.5 -346.5
(322.3) (423.8) (689.3) (219.3)
Live in Urban Area 633.0∗∗∗ 1032.4∗∗∗ 953.0∗ 562.2∗∗∗
(202.8) (283.9) (488.6) (124.5)
Married -970.7∗∗∗ -260.6 414.8 303.9
(336.2) (426.0) (678.7) (197.0)
Child Age -55.8 324.0 -24.2 397.3∗∗∗
(187.7) (282.1) (704.2) (146.4)
Child Age2 1.4 -6.2 -1.2 -9.2∗∗∗
(4.4) (6.3) (16.0) (3.6)
Child Age3 -0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1∗∗
(0.0) (0.0) (0.1) (0.0)
Male Child 484.6∗∗∗ 555.8∗∗∗ 0.0 0.0
(164.4) (209.9) (.) (.)
First Born Child -130.9 -26.6 154.5 52.0
(156.4) (214.7) (375.5) (86.4)
Last Born Child -151.1 145.2 -342.9 -87.2
(171.3) (232.9) (418.3) (94.3)
Constant -291.2 -7551.3∗ -846.3 -5765.1∗∗∗
(2457.0) (4130.7) (10402.7) (1973.8)
Number of Observations 2276 2276 1010 1266
Rural sample from China Health and Retirement Longitudinal Study in 2011 and 2013.
We exclude the cases where there is only one son or one daughter in the family in (3) and (4).
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 1.8 The Impact of NRPP on Children’s Labor Migration
Specifications Probability of Number of
Sending Migrant Children Migrant Children
Non-parametric linear, no control 0.256∗∗ 0.403
(0.122) (0.388)
Non-parametric linear, with control 0.277∗∗ 0.505
(0.123) (0.384)
Quadratic, no control 0.539∗∗ 0.636
(0.261) (0.796)
Quadratic, with control 0.565∗∗ 0.762
(0.266) (0.799)
Bias-corrected, optimal band-width 0.156∗∗ 0.336
(0.072) (0.256)
Control Mean 0.817 1.686
Observations 2,648 2,648
Community FE yes yes
Rural sample from China Health and Retirement Longitudinal Study in 2011 and 2013.
Nonparametric local linear regressions use triangular weights with a bandwidth of 6.
Fuzzy regression discontinuity estimation as in equation (13) and (14).
Bias-corrected, optimal band-width specification uses STATA rdrobust CCT option
Control variables include household size, education and income of both the
senders and receivers of the transfers, and sex ratio of the transfer senders.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Chapter 2: Differential Retirement Responses to Pension Among Rural Elderly Chinese
Abstract The retirement behavior of farmers has received less attention compared to that of the
urban laborers, because farmers usually do not have mandatory retirement ages nor formal pension
coverage, especially in the developing countries. The New Rural Pension Program (NRPP) in
China provides an opportunity to study the heterogenous retirement decisions of farmers, whose
labor supply patterns can be depicted as “ceaseless toil” but lack a model that summarizes the
key determinants of their retirement. This study proposes a retirement model that relates farmers’
wealth, health assets and sick time to their retirement decisions. This model explains the puzzling
empirical observation that wealthier farmers are less likely to retire after receiving the pension
compared to the poorer farmers. The findings suggest that less wealthy farmers tend to drop off
labor markets due to credit constraints and lack of investment in their health assets. Further pension
policy reforms might prioritize health benefits and access to credit, in order to prevent the farmers
from being trapped by poor health and credit constraints.
2.1 Introduction
The retirement behavior of farmers in developing countries has received much less attention
than that of urban laborers or of farmers in developed countries (Costa, 1995; Kimhi and Lopez,
1999; Pietola et al., 2003; Davis et al., 2009; Mann et al., 2017). This is probably because farmers
in developing countries usually do not have a mandatory retirement age, nor even pension cover-
age. However, as populations age in many developing countries such as China, Kenya, Pakistan,
Brazil and Mexico (United Nations, 2012), understanding retirement decisions of the rural elderly
populations is critical in studying the impact of aging on the rural labor market and the elderly’s
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well-being. Tackling aging challenges is particularly urgent for China, because accompanied by
the on-going rural-to-urban migration of the younger generation (NBS, 2006), rural China is aging
rapidly and people over age 65 will compose more than a third of the rural labor force by the middle
of this century (Zeng, 2009; Yang, 2013). Many developing countries choose to remediate the ag-
ing problems by expanding their social protection programs to cover the economically vulnerable
rural elders (Jung and Tran, 2012). However, the evidence about the causal impact of these social
programs on farmers’ retirement behavior is still limited, especially about the heterogenous impact
on the rural population with differential socioeconomic status. In this paper, I evaluate the impact
of the New Rural Pension Program (NRPP) in China on elderly farmers’ retirement behavior, and
propose a retirement model that explains the heterogenous responses of farmers by wealth status.
The labor supply patterns of the Chinese rural elders have the depiction of “ceaseless toil”
(Davis, 1991), and “working until they drop” (Pang, 2004) in the literature. Most descriptive
analyses document that the majority of the Chinese farmers will work into their late 60s or even
70s (Giles, 2011; Pang 2004). Only severe health conditions would stop the elders from working
(Davis, 1991; Pang, 2004; Giles, 2011). In addition, Pang (2004) also points out the puzzling ob-
servation that wealthier rural elders do not work less than the less wealthy farmers. This is puzzling
because if the income effect dominates retirement decisions, wealthier individuals should be more
likely to retire than the poorer ones who have to survive by working. Recent studies about NRPP
estimate the causal impact of exogenous pension wealth on the retirement behaviors of Chinese
elderly farmers, but the findings have been mixed. Ning et al. (2016) finds insignificant impact
of NRPP on the elders’ labor supply, and concluded that there is not much welfare improvement
of this rural pension program. In contrast, Chen et al. (2015) finds that after receiving pension
benefits from NRPP, the probability of retiring increased by 15 percent. Even though both health
and wealth could be important determinants of retirement decisions of farmers, previous literature
has not considered the interaction between these two factors, and the mechanism through which
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wealth and health affect the retirement behaviors of rural elders.
The first contribution of this study is introducing a retirement model for farmers that considers
the interaction of wealth and health. This model fills the knowledge gap of how exactly individual
wealth could affect health assets which further determine the physical capabilities of working. This
model points out the potential existence of a health poverty trap, where individuals with little wealth
are not able to maintain their health assets, which further prevent them from accumulating wealth.
The second contribution is providing empirical evidence for a causal impact of receiving rural
pension on retirement behavior in developing countries. Because pension coverage is the primary
governmental tool to address the aging population in rural areas, estimating the causal impact of
such programs would be helpful to guide further policy reforms.
The third contribution is the finding that Chinese rural elders are likely to be credit constrained.
With the anticipated pension income, the elders are not able to react until they receive the pen-
sion benefits. The existence of credit constraints not only implies the fading family support and
inefficient credit market in the rural area, it also reinforces the aforementioned health poverty trap,
where individuals might not be able to recover from poor health conditions because they do not
have access to credit.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2.2 introduces the model of retirement
and theoretical foundations of credit constraints. Section 2.3 provides the backgrounds for NRPP.
Section 2.4 describes the data. Section 2.5 discusses the empirical strategy and econometric issues.
Section 2.6 gives the estimation results and empirical evidence for the retirement model. Section
2.7 is the discussion of the policy implications followed by conclusions.
2.2 Theoretical Models
2.2.1 Retirement Model of Farmers with Health Assets
In general, farmers do not have a “retirement age”, or any retirement benefits that are con-
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tingent on retirement decisions. The labor participation decisions of farmers are results of utility
maximization that trades off consumption and leisure, with constraints on income, time and health.
The concept of health asset, which can increase the ratio of healthy time to sick time, is well studied
in the health economics literature (Grossman, 1972). I use the following dynamic model to illus-
trate the impact of pension benefits on labor participation decisions, considering the sick time of
farmers and a potential health-based poverty trap.
Individualsmaximize utility
∑T
t=0 βU(Ct, Tleisure,t) by choosing consumptionCt, LeisureTleisure,t,
wealth level in the next periodEt+1, and inputs for health productionMt subject to the budget con-
straint:
Ct + PmMt + Et+1 ≤ REEt + Tlabor,twt (1)
where Pm is the price of inputs for health production such as medical services and nutritional sup-
plements, RE is the gross return on wealth, which includes depreciation. Tlabor,t is the time spent
on labor and wt is the wage rate. Net investment in health asset Ht is equal to gross investment
minus depreciation:
Ht+1 −Ht = It(Mt;Xt)− δtHt (2)
where It is gross investment, which is a function of health production inputsMt and a set of individ-
ual characteristics such as education level that influences the efficiency of health production. The
semicolon differentiates the endogenous inputs choices from exogenous individual characteristics
that are given at the time of optimization. δt is the rate of depreciation of health, which is exogenous
but depends on age. In particular, death takes place when Ht ≤ Hmin. Time is constrained:
Tleisure,t + Tlabor,t + Tsick,t = Ttotal (3)
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where Tsick,t is the sick time that individuals can not work. Tsick,t can be considered as a decreasing
functionφ of health assetHt, which is positively associatedwith the individual’s wealth endowment








Thus, if an individual is born with high endowment, he/she can have more resources to spend in
maintaining his/her health assets. For example, he/she can purchase more medical services and
spend more on healthy diet than their counterparts with low endowment. As a result, people with
high endowment will be more physically capable and have less sick time, which leads to more
time in earning labor income than farmers with low endowment. On the contrary, farmers with low
endowment have less to spend on maintaining health, which further translates into more sick days
or less effective labor hours. This scenario is a typical health-based poverty trap, which means that
when endowment falls below a critical level, it is hard for people to escape the vicious cycle of
being sick and having low labor income.
Figure 2.1 illustrates the maximization, the role of sick time of individuals that differ by their
initial wealth endowment. For ease of the illustration, I consider only a one-period snapshot of the
dynamics by omitting the time subscripts. There are two types of individuals in Figure 2.1, the poor
farmers with low level of endowment El, and the rich farmers with high level of endowment Eh.
Point A shows the level of endowment consumption where the individual is perfectly healthy and
enjoys all available time for leisure. Before receiving the NRPP benefits, the optimal bundle for the
poor is at point C. In order to determine labor supply, sick time needs to be considered in this model.
Farmers with lower endowments have more sick days that they can not enjoy leisure or supplying
labor. Tsick(H(El)) denotes the amount of sick time for individuals with low endowments
1. As a
1The size of sick time is exogenous in the graph for illustration. There is also the case where less wealthy farmers
have more sick days, but are still less likely to retire than the wealthy farmers.
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result, the labor time before receiving NRPP benefits for farmers with low endowment is Tlabor0, l,
which is the segment in between leisure and sick time Tsick(H(El)) in Figure 2.1. NRPP benefits
induce a pure income effect that shifts the budget constraint in a parallel fashion. The new optimal
bundle for the poor farmers is at point D, which is to the northeast of point C. Because this point
is within the range of sick time, it means that receiving NRPP benefits will induce this individual
to retire. The rich farmers with more endowment have fewer sick days because they have more
resources to spend on maintaining their health assets. Before receiving NRPP benefits, the rich
farmers optimize at point E, which is to the northeast of C. This result does not necessarily mean
that the rich will work less than their poorer counterparts, because the rich farmers also have less
sick days. The situation depicted in Figure 2.1 shows that the labor time of rich farmers before
receiving NRPP, Tlabor0, h is bigger than that of the poor farmers, Tlabor0, l. To summarize, the
impact of NRPP potentially involves the income effect on leisure, which induces retirement for
those who had to work with poor health.
2.2.2 Labor Smoothing and Credit Constraint
In this section, I illustrate how the existence of a credit constraint affects labor smoothing in the
retirement model of farmers with health assets. The credit constraint is given by
Et+1 ≥ 0 (5)
which specifies that the beginning asset level in the next period cannot be negative. In other




βt[U(Ct, Tleisure,t)− λt(Ct + PmMt + Et+1 −REEt − (Ttotal − Tleisure,t − φ(Ht))wt) + µtEt+1]
where λt is the lagrangian multiplier for the budget constraint at period t, and µt is the lagrangian
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= −βtλt + βtγt + βt+1Rλt+1RH + βtφ
′
Ht = 0
Combining (a) and (c), (b) and (c), we’ll have the following Euler equations:
(e) U ′Ct = µt + βRU
′
Ct+1
(f) U ′Tleisure,t = µtwt + βREU
′
Tleisure,t+1
If we have no credit constraints, equation (e) and (f) would become:
(e′) U ′Ct = βREU
′
Ct+1
(f ′) U ′Tleisure,t = βREU
′
Tleisure,t+1
which indicate that the consumption and leisure will evolve smoothly across time depending on the
size of β and R, and the utility function. Most importantly, equation (e’) and (f’) do not involve
income distribution over time. Thus, any anticipated changes in permanent income should not
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induce jumps in consumption and labor supply paths1. However, when the credit constraint is
binding so that µt is positive, (e) and (f) indicate that the current period consumption and leisure will
be depressed against future consumption and leisure. In addition, the inter-temporal consumption
and leisure choices are not necessarily smoothed over time.
In the case of income smoothing, individuals adjust their labor supply to achieve a steady stream
of income which further allows them to smooth consumption. This means that income-smoothing
individuals will never encounter a binding credit constraint so that µt is zero in (e). There are
many empirical studies show that people achieve income smoothing by adjusting their labor supply
(Kochar 1999; Cameron and Worswick, 2003). They also give rise to the opportunity to use labor
supply to identify a credit constraint.
2.3 The New Rural Pension Program (NRPP) in China
Before the implementation of the New Rural Pension Program, the old Rural Pension Program,
in place from 1987 to 2008, was an unsubsidized individual contribution account system. However,
the participation rate had been extremely low, which lead to insufficient pension funds that could
barely insure the promised benefits for the rural elderly. In 1999, the rural population that had
participated in the old pension program started to shrink.
In fighting against increasing old-age poverty in the rural areas, China launched the New Rural
Pension Program (NRPP) in 2009, which covered more than 300 million Chinese by the end of
2012. Unlike the pension programs in the developed areas, the NRPP could be considered as a
conditional cash transfer program, where the conditions are minimal: being registered as rural
residents2 and age 60 or above. The NRPP aims at an universal coverage of formal and informal
workers in rural China. By the end of 2012, the central government and the local governments had
invested more than 232 billion RMB ( about 40 billion USD) in the pension fund, and all 2853
1In the rural agricultural sectors in China, farmers do not have an enforced “retire” option.
2The Chinese Hukou system, which is the population registration system, abolished its differentiation between
agricultural and non-agricultural households, but it could still indicate the type of area that a household lives in.
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counties in China had implemented the NRPP.
The pension fund consists of three parts: an individual contribution account, local government
subsidy, and central government subsidy. According to the guidance released by the State Council
of China, individuals can choose from five basic categories of individual premium: 100, 200, 300,
400 and 500 RMB per year per person1. Individual accounts are designed to be actuarially fair. A
local government may introduce more categories to adjust for increases in the cost of living, and
the more the individuals contribute to their accounts, the more subsidies local governments pay.
Pensioners receive payment from both the individual account and the basic pension benefit, where
the latter is subsidized by the central government. The average benefit level is about 700 RMB per
year, which is roughly 10% of the median annual individual income in the rural area.
All rural residents aged 16 or above who are not enrolled in the urban basic pension program
can enroll in NRPP voluntarily. Participants below age 45 are required to contribute at least 15
years to become eligible for pension payment upon reaching age 60. However, according to the
State Council, there are no required minimum years of contribution for those aged between 45 and
60, who are only suggested to contribute more to meet the shortfall in contributions to their account
over their remaining years before age 60. Most people aged 55 to 60 wait until age 60 to receive
the free basic pension offered by the central government without any contribution to the individual
account (Chen and Wang 2014). Pension payment is non-means tested, and non-contributory to
anyone aged 60 or above by the local rollout time of NRPP. Elders who are above age 60 are not
required to make any contribution to the pension fund.
2.4 Data
The data used in this study come from the China Health and Retirement Longitudinal Study
1The 100 RMB option is the most popular choice (Lei et al. 2011). The average replacement rates of the five
premium choices for a median earner who enrolls at the earliest possible age are 18.03%, 21.24%, 24.45%, 27.66%,
30.87%, respectively ranging from 100RMB to 500RMB. These replacement rates are still much lower than the ones
for a median earner who enrolls in the urban pension program in China (79%) or the old-age pension in the US (53%)
according to the OECD reports (www.data.oecd.org/pension).
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(CHARLS), which aims to collect a high quality, nationally representative sample of Chinese res-
idents ages 45 and older. The national sample includes about 10,000 households and 17,500 indi-
viduals in 150 counties/districts and 450 villages are included in the survey. The CHARLS data
is based on the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) in the US and is comparable with the surveys
such as the English Longitudinal Study of Aging, as well as the Survey of Health, Aging and Re-
tirement in Europe. The CHARLS questionnaire includes information on demographics, family
structure, private transfers, health status, work history, labor supply, pension, consumption and
assets acquisition.
Table 2.1 shows the summary statistics for the sample used in the analysis. I use a rural sample
in 2011/2012 that has an age range from 50 to 70, which means a bandwidth of 10 years around the
pension cutoff age 60. After additional dropping of missing records on age, gender, labor supply,
health status variables and pension receiving status, the sample includes 7977 individuals in 5211
households. The average age in the sample is about 60, and gender is well balanced between male
and female. On average, Chinese rural elders have about 4 years of education. About 75.6 percent
of the sample report to be still working. This binary labor supply variable takes value one if the
individual was engaged in agricultural work (including farming, forestry, fishing, and husbandry
for own family or others) for more than 10 days in the past year, or if the individual worked (not
including own housework or doing activities without pay) at least one hour in the last week, or if
the individual has a job but is temporarily laid-off. About 91.1 percent of the rural elders engage in
agricultural activities. A large majority of them (87.7%) are self-employed or working on their own
plots, and only 6% of the rural elders work as hired labor. Self-reported retirement age is around
65 years old, but this number increases as people age. This means that on average, rural elders
are postponing their retirement. Elders report on average 17.6 sick days in a year that they cannot
work. Majority of the elders (87.7%) own land. A little more than 9 percent of the individuals have
already received the NRPP benefits with an average monthly payment about 80 yuan per month.
49
The total savings include the elder couples’ holdings of cash, checking account balance and saving
account balance. Even though the mean for financial assets is about 6414 yuan, the median is about
500 yuan, which indicates that the distribution of financial assets in rural China is strongly right
skewed. Self-reported health variables show that most of the Chinese rural elders believe that they
are in either fair or poor health, and about 40 percent of the elders report that they have health
problems that limit labor supply.
2.5 Empirical Model and Econometric Issues
To estimate the causal effect of NRPP on the labor supply of the Chinese rural elders, I use a
fuzzy regression discontinuity design (RDD), made possible by the arbitrary age eligibility thresh-
old of the NRPP. According to the state council, rural residents who are age 60 and above are
eligible to receive the monthly payment from NRPP. However, in reality, not all the rural elders
who are eligible have received the pension benefits, which implies incomplete compliance. Anec-
dotal evidence has shown that a few counties refuse to pay pension benefits to the eligible elders if
their children are not enrolled in the pension program. One reason for this deviation from the offi-
cial policies set by the state council is that the central government requires the local governments
to subsidize at least 30 Yuan per person per year, which could be a burden if there is inadequate
participation from the elders’ prime-age children. Figure 2.2 shows the incomplete compliance
rate, which motivates the fuzzy regression discontinuity design.
My goal is to estimate the discontinuous changes in labor supply across the eligibility threshold.
Assuming that the unobserved variables are a smooth function of the running variable, this change
reflects the causal effect of the New Rural Pension Program. Since the running variable is discrete,
it is impossible to observe behaviors that are arbitrarily close to the threshold on both sides. This
means that I have to extrapolate the trend of the outcome variables away from the threshold. Poten-
tially, this extrapolation makes my results sensitive to the functional form of the running variable.
To show that my results are robust to functional form choices, I follow Lee and Lemieux (2010)
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and use two different functional forms. The first specification is a nonparametric local linear re-
gression, which estimates the following model using triangular weights to give higher weight to
observations that are closer to the threshold:
Yict = β0 + β1Ri + β2Xi + β3RiXi + αc + εict (6)
In equation (6), Yict denotes the outcome variable for household i, who resides in county c at
year t. Ri is the running variable, which is the age of the household head. Xi is a binary indicator
of whether the household head has already received pension benefits from NRPP. αc is a commu-
nity fixed effect, and εict is the idiosyncratic error. Since the pension-receiving status Xi might be
endogenous due to household-specific characteristics, I construct a binary variable which indicates
whether the household head is age 60 and above at the time of the survey and use it as an instru-
ment for the variable Xi. Because the policy eligibility rule is arbitrarily chosen by the central
government, it is exogenous to the pension-receiving status.
The second specification is a regression that flexibly controls for quadratic trends on both sides
of the threshold:
Yict = β0 + β1Ri + β2R
2
i + β3Xi + β4RiXi + β5R
2
iXi + αc + εict (7)
In both specifications, the coefficient of Xi, which is the pension-receiving status and instru-
mented by whether the person is 60 or not, gives the fuzzy RDD estimate. My baseline specification
uses a triangular kernel with a bandwidth of 10. Because there is no consensus on the selection of
the optimal bandwidth, I present results for a wide range of bandwidth between 6 and 10 years.
Standard errors are clustered at the community level to take care of the potential serial correlation
within a community.
Another concern about the RD design is whether the identifying assumptions hold, which in-
51
clude the smoothness of the observable characteristics of the household across the eligibility thresh-
old. If this assumption holds, we should not observe any discontinuities for the household char-
acteristics around the cutoff age. In addition, I show results by pooling the data from 2011 and
2013 as in chapter one, and discuss the reasons for using only the wave in 2011. These robustness
check results are shown in the appendix. Also, several falsification tests are performed at other
“pseudo-thresholds” where the NRPP eligibility did not change.
2.6 Results
2.6.1 Wealth and Health
Table 2.2 provides the empirical evidence for the retirement model with health assets and its
interaction with wealth. According to the model in section 2.2.1, wealthier farmers should have
better health and fewer sick days that prevent them from working. In order to measure health ob-
jectively, Activities of Daily Living (ADL) and Instrumental Activities of Daily Living (IADL)
indices (Katz, 1983) are constructed using self-reported physical functionality data of the rural
elders. ADL measures the ability of performing basic living tasks such as feeding, continence,
moving from one room to another, using a toilet, dressing and bathing. IADL involves more com-
plicated living tasks such as shopping, preparing hot meals, housekeeping, handling medications
and managing finance. Additionally, nine physical functionality variables are also examined. Table
2.2 shows that for both ADL and IADL indices, the individuals with more savings1 have signifi-
cantly better health condition and ability to take care of themselves than their poorer counterparts.
For the additional questions on physical functionalities, the low savers consistently perform worse
than the high savers.
The differences are significant especially for running or jogging 1 kilometer, walking 1 kilo-
meter, climbing several stairs without resting, lifting or carrying weights over 5 kilograms, and
1Savings are used to proxy individuals’ wealth endowment.
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picking up a small coin from a table. A balancing test on the age of high and low savers shows that
there is no significant age differences between the two groups1. This means that for people with
similar age, high savers are better at maintaining their health than the low savers.
In addition, Figure 2.3 shows that individuals with below median saving have more sick days
in the past year than their richer counterparts across almost all ages, and the gap becomes larger in
old age. This empirical evidence suggests the potential existence of a health poverty trap, where
farmers with lowwealth endowment remain poor and incapable in labormarket due to their inability
to maintain their health capital.
2.6.2 Labor Supply Response to NRPP in Full Sample
Table 2.3 shows the regression discontinuity analysis for the elders’ labor supply. Using the
full sample with 7977 individuals, there is a discontinuous decrease in labor supply around the
pension eligibility age. As shown in specification (1) in Table 2.3, receiving pension will decrease
the probability of working by 0.344, which indicates an effect size of about 45%. This result is
robust when demographic controls are added in specification (2), and is also robust when quadratic
specifications are used in (3) and (4). The corresponding RD graph is shown in Figure 2.4, where
the dots represent the means of labor supply variable at each age, the dashed curve represents the
non-parametric fit and the solid curve represents the quadratic fit.
Table 2.4 shows the robustness checks with respect to bandwidth choices. Table 2.5 and Table
2.6 show the falsification tests at age 61 and age 59, respectively. These results show that there is
positive impact of NRPP on retirement behaviors of the Chinese rural elders. However, it is not
entirely clear yet who is induced to retire and the reason behind it. Also, the finding that labor
supply is not smoothed around the pension eligible age contradicts the model of a perfect capital
market with forward-looking agents who should be able to smooth labor supply while anticipating
1Average age for low savers is about 55.1 years old, and 55.0 for higher savers. P-value of the t-test is insignificant.
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the pension income. However, there are several alternative explanations for this discontinuity other
than credit market failure. First, it is possible that the rural elders are not anticipating the NRPP
benefits due to poor advertisement of the program, so that the individuals can only react upon
receiving the benefits and the credit market plays no role before then. Second, even though the
rural elders are aware of the NRPP, they might not be forward-looking and further incorporate the
pension wealth into their permanent income. Third, labor market failure might also induce the
discontinuity in labor supply upon receiving NRPP benefits, because an imperfect labor market
can impede individuals from substituting own labor with hired labor. In order to partial out the
aforementioned possibilities, as well as to find out who are the ones that retire and why they do so,
I further divide the sample according to the amount of savings, and estimate the impact of NRPP
on labor supply in these subsamples.
According to the retirement model with health assets, we tend to observe more retirement be-
haviors in the less wealthy subsample. This is because less wealthy farmers tend to have more
sick days, and the income effect of NRPP would bring them into retirement more easily than for
the wealthier farmers. Regarding credit constraints, if the pension program is not well-known, or
the labor market is not fully functioning, or the Chinese rural elders are not able to make rational
expectation of their pension wealth, then the results in these subsamples should be consistent with
the whole sample result where individuals decrease labor supply discontinuously around pension
eligible age. In other words, if we see the discontinuity exists in only one subsample but not the
other, then result indicates credit market failure where individuals want to smooth labor supply but
are limited by credit constraints.
2.6.3 Labor Supply Response to NRPP in Savings Subsamples
Table 2.7 shows the regression discontinuity results in the above and below median savings
subsamples, and the corresponding RD graphs are in Figure 2.5. I divide the sample with regard
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to the median in order to minimize the loss of significance due to decreased statistical power. The
savings variable is taken from the question that asks the respondents “what is the total amount
of savings, including cash and the balance in bank accounts?” In Table 2.7, we observe that only
individuals in the below median savings group have a significant discontinuous decrease in labor
supply. The RD estimate in the above median savings subsample is insignificant and close to zero,
which indicates that the rural elders with above median savings are able to smooth labor supply
before receiving the benefits from NRPP. The magnitude of the RD estimate in the below median
savings subsample is much bigger than that in the above median savings subsample. The formal
test of the differences in RD estimates in specifications (1) and (3) from Table 2.7 is shown in spec-
ification (1) from Table 2.8. This test shows that the difference between the labor supply responses
to NRPP in below and above median savings groups is -0.592 and is significant at 10% level. From
Figure 2.5, we can see that the labor supply for the individuals with above median savings is almost
a continuous decreasing function of age. However, the labor supply for the individuals who have
below median savings is clearly discontinuous around the pension eligibility age.
I further compare the sample that has below median savings with the sample that has above
median savings to understand the reason behind the heterogenous responses to NRPP, and the po-
tential mechanisms that could lead to differential access to credit. Table 2.9 shows the balance tests
results by comparing the individual characteristics, as well as the labor supply, consumption, land
ownership and self-reported health outcomes across the two samples. The sample with below me-
dian savings is significantly older, has more females and is less likely to be married than the sample
with above median savings. For labor participation, saving-poor people are slightly less likely to
participate in the labor market than the saving-rich individuals, with a difference of 0.097. This
observation can be explained by the labor supply model in section 2.2.1. Because farmers with
different wealth endowments can have different health assets1 that translate into different amount
1As shown in Table 2.2.
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of sick time1, and farmers who drop from the labor force could be the ones that have low level
of wealth. In addition, people with below median savings are less likely to own land compared
to the people with above median savings. If we combine the statistics of land ownership with la-
bor supply, it is possible that farmers with their own land tend to work more on it and also have
a better chance to accumulate savings; and the farmers with no land tend to have less chance to
work and end up with less savings. Land ownership can also relate to access to credit because land
can be used as collateral when applying for credits through either public or private channels. Both
food and non-food consumption are lower for the saving-poor sample, but the self-reported health
statuses are roughly the same. Because individuals with more savings are less likely to be credit
constrained, we would expect that the people with less savings are less able to smooth labor supply
by depleting their savings than the individuals who are rich in savings. The finding here helps to
rule out the possibility that the program is not well-understood or not anticipated by the rural elders.
2.6.4 Labor Supply Response to NRPP in Wealth Subsamples
As further robustness checks, Table 2.10 shows the RD analysis with three different household
wealth index, and the corresponding RD graphs are from Figure 2.6 to Figure 2.8. Wealth index 1
is obtained from principal component (PCA) analysis of household possession of durable goods 2;
wealth index 2 is obtained from the PCA analysis of ownership of productive fixed capital assets
such as tractor, thresher, tractor tools, water pump and processing equipment; wealth index 3 in-
cludes both the durable goods and productive fixed capital assets. From Table 2.10, we can see that
using all three wealth indices, only the individuals in the below median wealth level group signifi-
cantly decrease their labor supply upon receiving benefits from NRPP. These results are consistent
with the analysis with savings, and are also confirming the implications of the retirement model in
1As shown in Figure 2.1
2These durable goods include automobile, electric bicycle, motorcycle, refrigerator, washing machine, TV, com-
puter, stereo system, video camera, camera, air conditioner, mobile phone, furniture, music instrument, valuable dec-
orations, ornaments, treasures and precious metal, antiques, valuable paintings and calligraphic work.
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2.2.1.
2.6.5 Consumption and Income Response to NRPP in Saving Subsamples
Table 2.11 shows the impact of NRPP on food and non-food consumption, estimated separately
for below and above median saving subsamples. The corresponding RD graphs are in Figure 2.9
and Figure 2.10. From Table 2.11 we can see that for both food and non-food consumption, both
of these effects are not statistically different from zero. The insignificant results of consumption
can be contrasted with the large and significant labor supply responses to the anticipated NRPP
income. The results in Table 2.11 suggests that the rural elders can smooth their consumption
before receiving benefits from NRPP, and this smoothness in consumption is potentially achieved
by income smoothing through labor adjustments especially for the relatively poorer rural elders.
Table 2.12 presents the RD estimates for household income, and the RD graphs are in Figure
2.11. The RD estimates in Table 2.12 are not statistically different from zero. In addition, the
point estimate for the below median saving group is much smaller than that for the above median
saving group. Judging from the RD graphs in Figure 2.11, household income as a function of age is
roughly smooth around the pension eligibility age, which indicates that even though income drops
rapidly with age for the Chinese rural elders, both groups with above and below median savings
can smooth their income while anticipating the pension benefits from NRPP.When we compare the
RD results for labor supply, consumption and household income, the evidence is consistent with
the permanent income model with forward looking agents. The relatively richer individuals, who
have above median savings or wealth level, have been able to smooth consumption. However, the
relatively poorer individuals with below median savings or wealth are credit constrained and need
to adjust labor supply to smooth consumption. As shown in the RD analysis of household income,
when individuals start to receive NRPP benefits, the income does not increase significantly because
these individuals might want to use the NRPP benefits to compensate for their leisure time, and
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maintain a steady but slightly decreased income level.
2.7 Discussion and Policy Implication
2.7.1 Welfare Implications of NRPP
The findings in the previous section support the retirement model of farmers in section 2.2.1,
where wealth plays an important role in affecting physical capability or health assets which further
translate into labor supply in the market. Because we see that less wealthy farmers could not
effectively maintain their health assets that would enable them to work, they could be trapped
in their poor health without external help. Before the rural-to-urban migration trend took place,
elder farmers could rely on their adult children for either their labor supply or private transfers.
However, as the younger generation flee the villages to cities, the elder farmers have to live off
of their own labor, which will further deteriorate their health and make them even less capable of
working. In such a scenario, the receipt of pension income could give them a chance to breathe and
rest. Even though it is found that in this study and also the others that NRPP does not improve the
consumption level significantly (Niu and Arends-Kuenning, 2016; Ning et al., 2016), the welfare
improvement of NRPP operates through its impact on leisure, especially for the poorer half of the
farmers.
2.7.2 Policy Implications
Because NRPP is already in the form of wealth transfers, further reform could focus on shaping
the pension package with more health benefits. For example, farmers who enroll in the program
before the eligibility age could have access to discounts on medical services or health consultation
services. These benefits could prevent them from falling into the health trap. Also, government
should improve the rural credit markets to make it easier for elder farmers to obtain credits, espe-
cially at the time of illness. Pension wealth itself is supposed to contribute to the farmers’ credit
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worthiness , but this increment in credit worthiness also relies on government’s credibility. As a re-
sult, government policies that aim to stabilize the pension program would be beneficial to farmers’
overall credibility. Also, further reforms of rural pension might give more benefits to the elders
without children or in bad health conditions, because these elders are most vulnerable to health and
income shocks due to their limited options to cope with risks.
2.7.3 Alternative Mechanisms of Empirical Findings and Future Research
Although health investment and its interaction with wealth possession can provide reasonable
rationales for the observed retirement behaviors, there might be other mechanisms that can also
explain the empirical findings. First, the introduction of NRPP might not be anticipated. The local
governments are unlikely to advertise NRPP only to the wealthy farmers, but the wealthier farmers
might have higher ability to comprehend the pension benefits than the less wealthier farmers. As a
result, the wealthier farmers can adjust their labor supply behavior in a more timely manner than the
less wealthy farmers. The question of whether the poor are myopic or irrational is formally tested in
Berg (2013). The author finds that the poor in South Africa are not myopic regarding their pension
wealth. Even though I do not have similar data as in Berg (2013), my interviews of farmers from
three rural villages in Northeast China suggest that the poor in fact paid more attention than the non-
poor to the NRPP benefits. This is because the benefits comprise a larger share of income for the
poor than for the non-poor. Second, the wealthy farmers might have jobs that are less physically
demanding than the less wealthy farmers. Due to data limitation on the specific activities that
farmers do, I am not able to test this hypothesis explicitly. If this is true, this mechanism will
complement the credit constraint finding, but require more flexibility of the retirement model to
incorporate different labor activities. Third, differential marginal products of labor between the
wealthier and less wealthy farmers can also explain why wealthier farmers are more reluctant to
retire. Because wealthier farmers tend to also have more human capital and other physical capital,
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their marginal products of labor tend to be higher. In other words, the opportunity cost of retiring
is higher for the wealthier farmers than the less wealthy ones. However, this hypothesis can be
well manifested in the labor supply model introduced in this paper. Higher marginal product of
labor can be represented by a steeper budget constraint for the wealthier farmers in Figure 2.1.
Consequently, we would observe an optimization solution to the left of point F. This means that
the wealthier farmers are less likely to retire than the less wealthy farmers. Future research can
focus on further testing the differential responses of farmers with different occupations, and see if
occupational choice is the reason behind the formation of the health poverty trap.
2.8 Conclusion
In this paper, I estimated the causal impact of NRPP on retirement behaviors in rural China,
and further analyzed the heterogeneous retirement responses. A model of farmers’ retirement with
health assets and wealth is proposed to explain the observed retirement patters. Some empirical
evidence of credit constraints is also found in rural China. These findings suggest that there is a
potential health trap reinforced by credit constraints that would prevent elder farmers from working
and enjoy leisure time. Even though welfare improvement in the form of leisure is found for NRPP,
policy reforms might further improve its efficiency by modifying its health benefits. Ceaseless toil
should not need be the destiny for farmers in the developing countries. As more and more of the
farmers climb out of the traps with some external help such as rural pension, working or leisure
could finally become a choice for the farmers in their happy later years in life.
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2.9 Figures and Tables
Figure 2.1 Illustration of Maximization
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Table 2.3 Impact of NRPP on Labor Supply
Labor Supply
Linear Non-parametric Quadratic
Specifications (1) (2) (3) (4)
NRPP receipt -0.344∗∗ -0.356∗∗ -0.563∗∗ -0.608∗∗
(-2.181) (-2.302) (-2.216) (-2.424)
Constant 0.684∗∗∗ 0.489∗∗∗ 0.749∗∗∗ 0.571∗∗∗
(112.184) (24.913) (62.563) (27.699)
Controls no yes no yes
Community FE yes yes yes yes
Observations 7977 7977 7977 7977
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
All specifications are estimated with bandwidth 10.
NRPP receipt variable is instrumented by whether the person is sixty.
Controls include marital status, education and gender.
Table 2.4 Robustness Check on Bandwidth Choices
Linear Non-parametric
Specifications bw6 bw7 bw8 bw9 bw10
NRPP receipt -0.386∗ -0.362∗ -0.375∗∗ -0.372∗∗ -0.344∗∗
(-1.674) (-1.783) (-2.024) (-2.176) (-2.184)
Controls yes yes yes yes yes
Community FE yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 5133 5969 6746 7321 7977
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
NRPP receipt variable is instrumented by whether the person is sixty.
Controls include marital status, education and gender.
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Table 2.5 Falsification Test at Age 61
Linear Non-parametric
Specifications bw6 bw7 bw8 bw9 bw10
NRPP receipt -0.177 -0.218 -0.235 -0.237 -0.227
(-0.829) (-1.172) (-1.413) (-1.554) (-1.612)
Controls yes yes yes yes yes
Community FE yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 4959 5722 6488 7253 7838
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
NRPP receipt variable is instrumented by whether the person is sixty.
Controls include marital status, education and gender.
Table 2.6 Falsification Test at Age 59
Linear Non-parametric
Specifications bw6 bw7 bw8 bw9 bw10
NRPP receipt 0.619 0.349 0.180 0.076 0.049
(0.782) (0.572) (0.391) (0.203) (0.154)
Controls yes yes yes yes yes
Community FE yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 5357 6157 6802 7477 7976
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
NRPP receipt variable is instrumented by whether the person is sixty.
Controls include marital status, education and gender.
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Table 2.7 Subsample with Above and Below Median Savings
Labor Supply
Below Median Savings Above Median Savings
Specifications (1) (2) (3) (4)
NRPP receipt -0.698∗∗ -0.652∗∗ -0.073 -0.094
(-2.512) (-2.442) (-0.381) (-0.493)
Controls no yes no yes
Community FE yes yes yes yes
Observations 3842 3842 4135 4135
Savings include the old couples’ savings in forms of cash
and bank account balance. Controls include marital status,
education and gender. All specifications are estimated with
bandwidth 10. t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01






Community FE yes yes
Observations 7977 7977
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Controls include marital status, education and gender.
All specifications are estimated with bandwidth 10.
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Table 2.9 Balance Tests of People Above/Below Median Saving and Younger than 60
Characteristics of the elders Below Median Above Median P-value of T-test
Age 55.090 54.979 0.239
Male 0.492 0.498 0.538
Married 0.924 0.947 0.001
Years of education 5.002 4.879 0.369
Labor Participation 0.818 0.888 0.000
Food Consumption in Past 7 Days 199.176 201.569 0.834
Monthly Non-food Expenditure 275.285 279.668 0.758
Land Ownership 0.821 0.926 0.000
Life Expectancy 75.000 75.000 1.000
Self-proposed retirement age 62.478 63.172 0.287































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2.11 Subsample with Above and Below Median Savings, on Food and Non-food Consump-
tion
Food Consumption Non-food Consumption
Below Median Above Median Below Median Above Median
Specifications (1) (2) (3) (4)
NRSP Receipt 63.04 -89.41 132.4 -115.2
(0.52) (-0.63) (0.71) (-0.60)
Controls yes yes yes yes
Community FE yes yes yes yes
Observations 3842 3842 4135 4135
Food and non-food consumption are measured as the total amount in the past seven days.
Savings include the old couples’ savings in forms of cash and bank account balance.
Controls include marital status, education and gender.
All specifications are estimated with bandwidth 10.
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 2.12 Subsample with Above and Below Median Savings, on Household Income
Household Income
Below Median Above Median
Specifications (1) (2)
NRPP Receipt -2103.8 -19103.8
(-0.13) (-0.97)
Controls yes yes
Community FE yes yes
Observations 3842 4135
Savings include the old couples’ savings in forms of cash and
bank account balance. Controls include marital status,
education and gender. All specifications are estimated
with bandwidth 10. t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Chapter 3: Limited Attention and Information Loss in the  
Lab-to-Farm Knowledge Chain: 




Abstract    The advancement of social network literature has fostered the lead/contact farmer 
modality of information transmission. However, there is limited evidence regarding the 
information efficiency of this modality, and the reasons of the potential information loss. In this 
article, we assess information efficiency along the knowledge transmission chain from researchers 
to agricultural extension agents (EAs) to lead farmers (LFs) to other farmers. By asking the same 
set of questions about a fairly well known technology, pit planting, we construct a measure of 
knowledge at each node of the knowledge transmission chain. Descriptive evidence shows that the 
majority of information loss happens at the EA-to-LF link, and that the loss is potentially caused 
by limited attention of both EAs and LFs to all important details of the technology. With more 
evidence about the importance of knowledge for technology adoption, we suggest that EAs 
emphasize all crucial dimensions of an agricultural technique during demonstrations and visits in 






Agricultural extension plays a crucial role in promoting agricultural productivity, increasing 
food security, improving rural livelihoods, and promoting agriculture as an engine of economic 
growth in developing countries. As one of their major functions, extension services are critical to 
move research from the lab to the field, and to ensure a return on investment in research by 
translating new knowledge into innovative practices. In other words, agricultural extension is the 
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application of scientific research and knowledge to agricultural practices through farmer 
education.  
However, we know of only limited objective measures that assess the quality of extension 
services and other modalities of information transmission (Buadi, Anaman, and Kwarteng 2013). 
This makes it hard to ensure that scientific knowledge is successfully received by farmers. If 
farmers do not fully understand a technology, how can they fully avail themselves of its benefits? 
If farmers cannot benefit from the technology, why would they keep adopting it? This research 
attempts to evaluate the efficiency of information transmission along the knowledge chain from 
lab to farm and assess the types of information failure using a limited attention model (Hanna et al. 
2014). By tracking knowledge scores of geographically linked extension agents (EAs), lead 
farmers (LFs), and other farmers (OFs), we provide an objective measure of information loss for 
the current extension modality in Malawi. We focus our analysis on Malawi, which is among the 
poorest and most food-insecure countries in Africa (Malawi, MoAIWD 2016), because in recent 
years the Malawian government has pioneered several modalities in disseminating knowledge 
from research to farmers. These include the promotion of pluralistic and demand-driven extension 
systems in 2000, and the LF (or farmer-to-farmer) approach in 2003, which was formally 
institutionalized in the Malawi Department of Agricultural Extension Services programs in 2007 
(Kundhlande et al. 2014). These policies make Malawi an ideal country in which to assess the 
information efficiency of different information transmission modalities. The results of our analysis 
in Malawi also have the potential to exert a major influence on many other developing countries.  
We find that the majority of information loss occurs at the EA-to-LF link, because an EA’s 
knowledge is well above that of an LF, but an LF’s knowledge is not statistically different from 
that of OFs. We further unpack information loss and assess whether it is likely due to teaching 
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failure (EA side) or learning failure (LF and OF side). By comparing and contrasting the models of 
overall knowledge and knowledge by single dimensions, we find that when considering all farmers 
(OFs plus LFs), the advice of EAs on pit planting can significantly increase farmers’ overall 
knowledge. However, the incremental increase in knowledge is concentrated in only one of six 
dimensions. These results indicate that farmers have limited attention in learning a 
multidimensional technology. When we consider only the interaction between EAs and LFs, we 
find that the EAs’ teaching is not effective in increasing LFs’ overall knowledge, which serves as 
the evidence for teaching failure at the EA-LF link. The information failure identified here could 
be explained by a limited attention model (Hanna et al. 2014), where information loss occurs not 
because of unavailability of data but because of the lack of ability to pay attention to all details of 
data. This implies that some low-cost information devices are necessary in maintaining 
information efficiency. For example, if EAs were to distribute a handout during their teaching 
sessions that summarized all important details of implementing the technology, this could reduce 
information loss due to limited attention.  
Lack of information has long been recognized as one explanation for low adoption of 
agricultural technology that promotes productivity (Foster and Rosenzweig 1995; Conley and 
Udry 2010; Levitt, List, and Syverson 2013; Micheels and Nolan 2016), along with other 
explanations such as credit constraints, differences in preferences, differences in agroecological 
conditions, and spatially heterogeneous costs and benefits (Duflo, Kremer, and Robinson 2011; 
Suri 2011). Research on information failure mostly focuses on diffusion through a social network, 
and the policy recommendation of such research is to target the most socially connected people in 
the networks to reduce cost and increase information efficiency. The modality of lead farmers (or 
contact farmers) aligns with this line of research. In Malawi, as in many other countries, both 
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governmental and nongovernmental agencies have adopted the LF concept. An LF is supposed to 
learn from the EA and then diffuse the information to other farmers in his or her community. 
However, recent studies on this modality provide mixed evidence regarding its efficacy. Fisher, 
Holden, and Katengeza (2017) link 180 LFs and 455 followers in four districts in Malawi and find 
that LFs’ motivation, awareness, and adoption of conservation agriculture techniques are 
positively associated with OFs’ awareness and adoption. But they do not address the information 
efficiency problem among LFs and OFs. Some analyses find that training LFs might not increase 
information efficiency or technology adoption of farmers in the community in the context of 
Mozambique (Kondylis, Mueller, and Zhu 2017; Beaman et al. 2015) and raise questions about the 
effectiveness of this modality of information transmission. Kondylis, Mueller, and Zhu (2017) use 
field experiments to show that even though after training LFs increase their adoption, their 
knowledge about the technologies does not increase significantly. Additionally, the training of 
EAs and LFs does not affect the adoption of OFs. Our analysis is consistent with their result that 
inefficiency happens at the EA-to-LF node and provides further evidence that information loss at 
the LF node might be due to LFs’ limited attention to learning all necessary details of a technology. 
Alternatively, EAs might not fully emphasize the importance of paying attention to various details 
during their teaching sessions. Instead of focusing on the training, Beaman et al. (2015) use a 
randomized control trial to show that the mode of selecting the LFs also matters for information 
efficiency. They argue that selecting and training multiple LFs is critical, because their results 
show that farmers learn and adopt more in an environment where multiple people are adopting the 
technology and are knowledgeable about it, compared with an environment where only a single 
trained LF exists in the community. Our results complement their analysis, because even if LFs are 
 78 
“correctly” chosen based on merits about social connectivity, lack of attention during the training 
will still result in information loss during knowledge transmission.  
Agricultural technologies do exist that potentially can improve Malawi’s agricultural productivity, 
food security, and nutrition; however, there are constraints to their adoption. Among the potential 
constraints is information failure due to poor understanding of a multidimensional technology, 
which means that several important parameters or details are attached to the successful 
implementation of a particular technique. In order to best test the limited attention theory of 
information failure, we use pit planting—a technology proven to promote yields (Haggblade and 
Tembo 2003)—as our focus in this analysis. Pit planting is among the improved agricultural 
technologies widely promoted by governmental and nongovernmental service providers in Malawi 
to boost productivity and at the same time adapt to extreme weather.1 Pit planting is ranked at the 
top of all technologies on which Malawian farmers have received advice from extension agents 
(Ragasa and Niu 2017). The technique is also relatively well known among Malawian farmers, 
with an awareness of 26 percent (Ragasa and Niu 2017).  
Another reason for choosing pit planting as our focus is that the costs of the technique are 
mostly for labor—monetary costs are low—and therefore we can isolate the information failure 
hypothesis from alternatives such as credit constraints. Most important, pit planting is rather 
complicated and multidimensional. According to agronomic researchers, one needs to consider 
potentially six dimensions when pit planting in order to maximize the benefits: depth of the pits (5 
to 15 centimeters), diameter of the pits (15 to 50 centimeters), distribution of the pits (straight row 
or along the contour lines), distance between pits (50 to 100 centimeters), whether to use fertilizer 
(should use fertilizer), and the optimal type of fertilizer that should be used in the pits (organic 
                                                     
1 Other heavily promoted technologies are chemical and organic fertilizer use, conservation agriculture, one seed-one hole 
maize planting, and use of improved varieties (Ragasa et al. 2017). 
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fertilizer) (Anschütz et al. 2003; Malesu, Oduor, and Odhiambo 2008 UNEP 2012; WOCAT 
2007). Of all the technologies EAs promote, they consider pit planting the most difficult, followed 
by conservation agriculture and animal house construction (Ragasa et al. 2017). Out of 10, which 
is the highest level of difficulty, EAs rated pit planting 2.5 on average in terms of difficulty in 
mastering pit planting technology and 4.38 on average in terms of perceived difficulty for farmers 
in understanding pit panting technology, which can also be interpreted as the difficulty in teaching 
this technology to the farmers (Ragasa et al. 2017). For all technologies, EAs’ subjective ratings 
were moderate in terms of farmers’ difficulty understanding the technology. However, we would 
like to evaluate the information transmission process in a more rigorous way in case the EA’s 
subjective measures are not revealing the full picture. 
We hypothesize that during their teaching sessions, the EAs might not emphasize all of the 
important details (teaching failure) or the farmers might not pay full attention to all of the 
dimensions (learning failure), or both. As a result, when farmers go back and try the technology on 
their own plots, their pits are not correctly implemented, which results in unsatisfactory return on 
the technology investment and finally leads to low adoption. Nowadays, many technologies are 
grouped into packages and promoted to the farmers. Besides the complementarity of the 
technologies in the package, the knowledge involved to use the package is multidimensional and 
potentially hard to comprehend fully. Thus, it is crucial to understand the nature of information 
failure along the chain formed by EAs, LFs, and ordinary farmers and to determine how 
transmission can be improved. We contribute to the literature on technology diffusion by 
constructing a complete information chain from the researchers to the farmers and identifying the 
link at which information loss takes place. In addition, to our knowledge, we are the first to apply a 
limited attention model to explain information efficiency in the context of evaluating extension 
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services. Lastly, while there is perhaps too much attention in the literature on adoption of external 
inputs (mainly fertilizer or improved varieties), given that liquidity constraints and heterogeneous 
profits can be the main issues, we focus on pit planting, which is not much researched but is 
heavily promoted in Malawi and other countries, to illustrate what constrains the adoption of a 
technology package with relatively low external input requirements.  
Section 3.2 of the paper introduces the theoretical background, Section 3.3 describes the dataset 
and analytical methods, and Section 3.4 introduces the researcher-to-farmer knowledge chain. 
Section 3.5 discusses the results that try to separate teaching failure from learning failure. Section 
3.6 shows the cluster, or localization, analysis of knowledge, Section 3.7 investigates how 
extension delivery methods and intensity are related to knowledge scores, and Section 3.8 
summarizes the association of knowledge scores and adoption results. Section 3.9 concludes and 
provides policy implications.  
 
3.2 Theoretical Background 
 
We base our analysis on a theoretical model of technological learning under which people 
learn through noticing: they choose which technical dimensions to attend to when learning to 
apply a technology from EAs or OFs. Hanna et al. (2014) point out that learning is about not only 
the availability of data but also what people notice in those data. In the context of dissemination of 
agricultural technology, learning usually takes place at demonstrations by EAs or LFs. Even 
though the essential details of a technology are demonstrated during the teaching sessions, farmers 
might not pay attention to every one of those details. And when the farmers experiment with the 
technology by themselves, they tend to consistently ignore the dimensions that they did not pay 
attention to at the beginning. A vicious feedback loop arises: even with readily available data 
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generated from their experimentations, farmers who initially ignore an important dimension of a 
technology will not attend to it, and consequently will not learn whether it does matter.  
The limited attention model builds on Schwartzstein’s (2014) study in psychology. Three 
major assumptions are used to set up the model. First, there are N parameters associated with a 
technology. Those parameters are unknown to the farmers and need to be learned through 
demonstrations and experiences. In addition, farmers attach prior weights of importance to the 
various parameters; farmers might not think all parameters are equally important. Second, 
attention is costly in the sense that there is a shadow cost of mental energy and time associated with 
paying attention to each dimension of the N parameters. The more dimensions farmers attend to, 
the greater the cost they will incur. Third, farmers maximize the expected net payoff, which is the 
yield minus attentional costs.  
The model produces several predictions that are relevant for our analysis. First, farmers may 
fail to attend to some dimensions.2 This naturally arises from the consideration of costly attention. 
Second, farmers persistently choose only suboptimal parameter levels along dimensions that they 
do not attend to. Third, farmers may fail to optimize parameter levels of neglected dimensions 
even if they are generating data during experiments that would allow them to optimize. This 
prediction points out the possibility that farmers might not be able to learn a technology fully by 
themselves if no one reminds them of the dimensions that they have neglected from the beginning. 
Fourth, summaries of data can change farmers’ behaviors. Thus, a low-cost device, such as a 
handout after farm demos or field visit days with all important details of a technology, could 




                                                     
2 All propositions and predictions can be found in Hanna et al. (2014). 
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3.3 Data and Analytical Methods 
 
This research is based on data from multiple sources that include a household survey, a 
community survey, and in-depth interviews with LFs and EAs. The International Food Policy 
Research Institute (IFPRI) conducted the surveys and interviews between August and October 
2016. The surveys cover 3,001 households and 299 sections (communities) in all 29 districts in 
Malawi. Among the 5,065 interviewed individuals, 544 were LFs. The service provider surveys 
cover 72 extension agents from both governmental and nongovernmental organizations. The full 
list of districts, extension planning areas, and sections was obtained from Malawi’s Ministry of 
Agriculture, Irrigation, and Water Development. The number of communities and households per 
district were determined using probability proportional to size (PPS) sampling. We randomly 
selected 300 sections based on the required sample per district according to the PPS method. For 
each randomly selected section, one group village was randomly selected as the enumeration area. 
The enumeration areas are randomly selected for each district based on equal probability sampling 
so that each enumeration area has an equal chance to be included. For each sample enumeration 
area, a full list of households was generated by the survey team with the help of village leaders. 
The list was stratified into households with LFs and households without LFs, and a total of 10 
households were randomly selected so that eight to 10 households without LFs and zero to two 
households with LFs are selected, depending on the presence of LFs in the community. 
Community leaders and the representatives of the village development or agricultural committee 
are interviewed for community surveys. Household head and the spouse are interviewed for 
household surveys whenever applicable.  
After the sample households were selected, a single member or two of the selected households 
who were most knowledgeable about agricultural production, agricultural marketing, and food 
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preparation were selected for face-to-face interviews. We also collected plot-level data to enable 
measurement of production and productivity. 
To produce a credible assessment, we paid close attention to quality control processes. First, 
the questionnaires for the household and community surveys underwent various reviews, inputs, 
and iterations among IFPRI researchers and other research organizations, as well as the Malawian 
key stakeholders. Second, we used various methods and sources to complement and triangulate 
data and evidence. Third, implementation of the surveys involved extensive training of 
enumerators and the use of computer-assisted personal interviewing on tablet computers, which 
reduces measurement errors and enables day-to-day monitoring of the data collection process. For 
a more comprehensive summary of the data collection and sample characteristics, please refer to 
the IFPRI reports (Ragasa and Niu 2017; Ragasa and Qi 2016. 
In this research, we focus on the part of the sample that is aware of pit planting, and we regard 
the rest of the sample as having zero knowledge of this technology. To measure the completeness 
of the farmers’ knowledge, we ask the farmers who are aware of pit planting the following six 
questions about the technology:  
 
How long should the diameter of the pit be (centimeters)?  
How deep should the pit be (centimeters)?  
What is the distance between the pits (centimeters)?  
Do you use fertilizer in the pits?  
What type of fertilizer is used?  
How are your pits distributed on the ground?  
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Farmers’ answers to these questions are recorded and compared to the suggested range of correct 
answers provided by the agronomic researchers. Appendix Table C.1 shows a summary of 
farmers’ answers and the suggested range of correct answers. Using that information, we construct 
six binary variables of whether the farmer’s answer falls in the suggested range, and the 
summation of those six binary variables is called the knowledge dimension variable, which 
measures the farmers’ overall knowledge of pit planting. 
Table 3.1 shows the summary statistics of our analytical sample. There are 1,243 individuals 
who are aware of pit planting; that number includes 283 LFs and 960 OFs. On average, farmers 
correctly answered 3.79 out of 6 questions. Of those who are aware of pit planting, 44 percent 
reported having adopted it at some point, including those who are not currently adopting it on their 
plot. Eighteen percent of farmers are currently adopting pit planting (2015/2016 cropping season). 
Fourteen percent of those farmers have received advice on pit planting from an EA regardless of 
the EA’s organization. Most such advice comes from government EAs (13 percent), with 5 percent 
coming from nongovernmental organization (NGO) EAs and 1 percent coming from both private 
and farm organization EAs.  
Weather conditions are an important part of spatial heterogeneity, and such conditions 
potentially affect both knowledge and adoption behaviors. The variable “number of months with 
abnormal rainfall” is constructed with 10 recent years of rainfall data from the Climatic Research 
Unit TS (CRU TS) dataset. We find the monthly rainfall according to the geographical coordinates 
of each surveyed household, and calculate the 10-year average and standard deviation for each 
month in order to obtain a z-score for the monthly rainfall distribution. Using the distribution, we 
are able to find the number of months with abnormal (|z-score| > 1.5) rainfall at each households’ 
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residence region. On average, farmers experienced three months of abnormal rainfall in 2015 that 
largely deviates from the 10-year average.  
We also have information about other channels and activities from which the farmers can 
learn about pit planting without directly consulting EAs. Those include farmer clusters, farm 
demonstrations, village agricultural committees, group agricultural committees, agricultural 
training centers, listening clubs and community meetings, use of print material and library, 
listening to the radio, and receiving information from mobile vans. Information on financial capital 
and wealth is captured by household asset values and total livestock units in 2015. The variable 
“household asset value” is the total monetary value of 11 types of household assets—air 
conditioner, radio, CD player, TV, refrigerator, washing machine, bicycle, motorcycle, 
automobile, oxcart, and tractor. 
Physical land capital is captured by the variable “landholding,” which reflects the total 
landholding in acres in 2015. Human capital is represented by the years of education of the 
household’s head and the number of adults in the household, which is also a proxy for labor supply 
in the household. Geospatial controls include whether the individual comes from northern, central, 
or southern Malawi. Other social capital variables include the distance to the nearest road, number 
of people in one’s social network, number of associations attended, and an index for connectivity, 
which is constructed from principal component analysis with binary variables of the frequency of 
listening to radio, watching TV, going to the nearest town, talking on the phone, and going to the 
nearest market.  
We use two kinds of analytical method to analyze the data. First, to identify the node that loses 
the most information along the information chain from lab to field, we link EAs, LFs, and OFs 
geographically to construct the information chain, and use paired t-tests to see whether the 
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knowledge scores of the three groups differ from each other. Ideally, if the information chain is 
perfectly efficient, there should be no information loss from lab to field. In other words, the 
knowledge scores of EAs, LFs, and ordinary farmers should be the same and perfect. However, if 
there is information loss, the scores might not be perfect and might differ. We first obtain the 
information loss at the EA-LF node, which is the difference between EA’s and LF’s scores. We 
then find the information loss at the LF-OF node. By testing the differences between the EA-LF 
difference and LF-OF difference, we can tell which node incurs the most information loss.  
Second, to further analyze whether the information loss is caused by teaching failure or learning 
failure, we use regression models to find the correlates between the knowledge variables and the 
extension service variables. In one model, we regress the knowledge dimension variable on the 
extension service variables while controlling for other forms of access to information, financial 
capital, land capital, human capital, geospatial variables, and social capital variables. In the other 
model, we replace the dependent variable in the previous model with the binary knowledge 
variables for each dimension. If we observe that the extension service variables are positive and 
statistically significant in the knowledge dimension regression, we then know that there is less of a 
teaching problem, because the EAs are able to raise the overall knowledge scores of the farmers. If 
we further observe that in the single-dimension regressions, the extension variables are positive 
and significant in only one or two dimensions, then there are potentially learning failures due to 
farmers not paying enough attention to all the dimensions in the technology package. However, if 
the extension service variables are not significant in the overall knowledge dimension regression 
and, in addition, they are not significant in the single-dimension regressions, then teaching failure 
may exist. Even if the extension service variables are significant in only one or two 
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single-dimension regressions, that could still be due to teaching failures where the teachers (EAs) 
are not emphasizing all important details of the technology. 
3.4 Knowledge Chain Analysis 
 
Before examining the geographically linked knowledge chains, we use all available 
knowledge information we have for EAs, LFs, and OFs and plot that distribution in Figure 3.1. We 
can see that the EAs are more likely to achieve higher scores than farmers; however, none of them 
achieves a perfect score on all six dimensions, which reflects the potential inefficiency in the EA 
trainings. The distributions of LFs and OFs are not obviously different, which means that in 
general, LFs’ knowledge is not superior to that of the other farmers. We show additional statistical 
evidence regarding this argument in the latter part of this section. Some farmers in the sample do 
achieve full scores on all dimensions, whereas no EAs in the sample achieve full scores. This 
observation reflects the possibility of localization of knowledge, meaning that farmers might 
adjust their knowledge according their local environment. We present detailed analysis regarding 
clustering, or localization, in Section 3.5. 
To determine whether any information loss occurs along the lab-to-field knowledge 
transmission chain, we link EAs, LFs, and OFs by the agents’ operational and farmers’ residential 
areas. This geographical information is covered in both the extension provider surveys and the 
household surveys, where EAs and LFs are asked about their respective operational areas. Using 
this information, we construct one complete knowledge chain (EA-LF-OF) with 253 OFs, 89 LFs, 
and 47 EAs. For the rest of the sample, we either do not know the farmers’ LF or we do not know 
their EAs. To fully utilize the data, we also construct two partial chains: an EA-LF chain with 37 
EAs and 123 LFs, and an LF-OF chain with 240 LFs and 1,063 other farmers.  
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With the EA-LF partial chain, we use a paired t-test to see whether the knowledge scores or 
overall knowledge dimensions of the EAs are the same as those of the LFs. Table 3.2 shows the 
test results. Within this partial chain, the EAs score an average of 4.35 dimensions correctly about 
pit planting, which is significantly higher than the LFs’ average score. The difference is 0.56 and is 
statistically significant at the 1 percent level. These results show that, first, EAs’ knowledge about 
pit planting is not perfect and provides cause for worry because they are supposed to be the experts 
on agricultural technologies and are the first step in transmitting lab research to the field. Second, 
the EAs are at least better trained than the LFs. Third, that the knowledge scores of the EAs are 
different than those of the LFs reveals information loss in this part of the knowledge chain.  
We look at the LF-OF partial chain in Table 3.3 The paired t-test results show that the average 
knowledge of LFs is slightly better than that of the OFs; however, the difference is not statistically 
different from zero. This means that there is not much difference between the LFs’ knowledge and 
the ordinary farmers’ knowledge of pit planting. The results show that information loss is minimal 
at the link between LFs and OFs. However, both types of farmers know only slightly more than 
half of the dimensions that are required to maximize the benefits of the technology. These 
observations are consistent with the literature that looks at learning from neighbors, where the 
impact of EAs is significant at the beginning, but in the long term, learning from neighbors (or 
LFs) plays a more critical role in the learning process (Krishnan and Patnam 2013; Conley and 
Udry 2010).  
Next, we use the complete knowledge chain (EA-LF-OF) to determine whether more 
information loss occurs at the EA-LF link or the LF-OF link. Table 3.4 shows the result of this test. 
Using the complete knowledge chain, we see that information loss at the EA-LF link is 0.56 and 
the loss at the LF-farmer link is 0.05. So the loss at the EA-LF link is significantly greater than that 
 89 
at the LF-farmer link. Therefore, most of the information loss occurs during the transmission 
process between EAs and LFs. In addition to that test, we also find that 19 out of 253 OFs in this 
complete chain have received advice about pit planting directly from EAs. So we further test 
whether those OFs’ knowledge is different from that of the rest of the OFs. Table 3.5 shows that 
the knowledge of the OFs who directly receive advice from an EA is significantly greater than the 
knowledge of those who do not. This indicates that the LFs might play a weak role in transmitting 
knowledge. Even though this part of the analysis cannot reveal the exact nature of the inefficiency, 
it does raise questions about the efficiency of the LF modality for technology diffusion. 
To further identify the type of the inefficiency problem, we use regression analysis to 
determine whether the problem consists of a teaching failure on the part of the EAs or a learning 
failure on the part of the farmers. We discuss those results in the next section.  
3.5 Teaching Failure or Learning Failure 
 
As stated in the data and analytical methods section, we compare and contrast the regressions 
of the overall knowledge dimension variable and the binary single-dimension variables to 
understand the nature of the information loss.   
Table 3.6 presents the regression results of overall knowledge dimension variables on 
extension service variables and a set of control variables using all farmers who are aware of pit 
planting. Specification (1) is the simple model that shows the correlation between overall 
knowledge and receiving advice about pit planting from any EAs, regardless of the type of the EA. 
This extension variable is positive and significant in explaining farmers’ overall knowledge, which 
means that extension services are effective in terms of increasing farmers’ overall knowledge, so 
this does not support the teaching failure hypothesis. Specification (2) includes the control 
variables that represent other forms of access to information, financial and land capital, human 
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capital, geospatial variables, and social capital. The coefficient on the extension service variable 
remains positive and significant after adding the control variables into the regression. We can see 
that abnormal rainfall conditions tend to decrease farmers’ knowledge, but the effect is only 
marginally significant. Attending agricultural training centers has a negative impact on 
knowledge, which suggests that the educational content of such training centers could be 
misleading. Attending community meetings is helpful in learning about pit planting. More 
landholdings decrease the knowledge of pit planting. This could be due to the large labor cost 
involved with planting pits on a large amount of land. People who live in southern Malawi tend to 
know less about pit planting than those who live in the central region. Even though the number of 
people in one’s social network has a negative impact on pit planting knowledge, the magnitude of 
the impact is very small compared with other significant factors. The more associations attended, 
the more the farmers would know about pit planting. 
Specifications (3) and (4) are similar to (1) and (2) but replace the extension service variable 
with variables that differentiate the types of EA. We observe that only advice from government 
EAs has a significant impact on farmers’ overall knowledge about pit planting. Potentially, this 
could indicate that government EAs are more efficient than nongovernment EAs in teaching 
farmers about this technology. 
Because the dependent variable is a discrete variable ranging from 1 to 6, we further use 
Poisson models as robustness checks. However, the Poisson models require the value of the 
dependent variable to be independent, which means that the answer to one knowledge question is 
independent from the other questions. Thus, our overall knowledge dimension variable might not 
satisfy this assumption. As a result, the Poisson regressions have limited explanatory powers 
compared with the ordinary least squares models. We observe in specifications (5) and (7) that the 
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extension variables still have a positive and significant impact on farmers’ overall knowledge, but 
the coefficients lose significance when control variables are included, which might be because of 
the unsatisfied assumption of Poisson models.  
To investigate possible learning failures, we further look at the impact of extension services 
on each dimension of pit planting knowledge. Table 3.7 shows the results of these regressions with 
controls. We see that the extension service variable has significant impact only on the third 
dimension (distance between pits) and not on the other dimensions. This means that even though in 
Table 3.6 we find EAs to be effective in teaching, farmers can improve only on limited dimensions 
of knowledge. The limited attention model of learning (Hanna et al. 2014) can be applied to 
understand this result—that is, students can attend to only limited dimensions of a new technology, 
especially when learning a multidimensional technology such as pit planting. Since the dependent 
variables here are binary, we use probit models as robustness checks, and the results in Table 3.8 
are consistent with those in Table 3.7. 
Because in the previous section, we show that the majority of information loss occurs at the 
EA-LF link, we want to further focus the regression analysis on the sample with only LFs, and see 
what is causing the information failure. Table 3.9 shows the results with only LFs. In contrast to 
the results in Table 3.6, we see that receiving advice from any EA variable does not have 
significant impact on LFs’ overall knowledge. When we differentiate the source of advice, the 
only significant extension service impact is from the farmer organization EAs, which constitute 
the fewest number of EAs in Malawi. These results suggest that there could be a teaching failure 
between the majority of EAs and LFs, because government, private, and NGO EAs cannot 
effectively increase the knowledge of the LFs. When we analyze knowledge by single dimensions, 
the findings in Table 3.10 also support the teaching failure hypothesis. This is because we observe 
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that the government EAs do not help increase the knowledge of any of the dimensions. In addition, 
even though private EAs significantly improve knowledge on the second dimension, they seem to 
provide confusing advice on the fifth dimension, which leads to a decrease in farmers’ knowledge. 
A similar negative impact on knowledge is found with NGO EAs on the sixth dimension. The 
probit analysis in Table 3.11 confirms the findings in Table 3.10. Even though we cannot fully rule 
out the existence of LFs’ learning failures, the evidence from the analysis with only LFs tends to 
support the hypothesis of EAs’ teaching failures, which include failing to emphasize all important 
dimensions and offering confusing advice that decreases farmers’ knowledge scores. 
To summarize, we find that when considering all farmers, the analysis reveals failures in 
learning due to farmers’ limited attention. They might not be able to observe all the crucial details 
of EAs’ demonstrations. Turning to the analysis with only LFs, the evidence supports teaching 
failures on the part of EAs who might not be comprehensive and always right about the content 
they are imparting. Additionally, less than one-third of the whole population is aware of pit 
planting, and that low level of awareness could itself also be counted as a teaching failure on the 
part of the EAs. 
However, we have been assuming that there is no localization of knowledge. Even though the 
lab researchers’ answers are in the form of suggested ranges, the technology knowledge that is 
locally correct could still fall outside these ranges. In the following section, to determine whether 
localization, or clustering, of knowledge about pit planting is present, we use cluster analysis and 
present the results with dendrograms. 
3.6 Cluster Analysis of Knowledge 
 
We turn to the question of whether there is localization of knowledge. That is, are the 
knowledge data clustered within geographical areas? If localization of knowledge is present, we 
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would need to reconsider the way we define the correct answers to our knowledge questions. Since 
the smallest geographical unit that we use to sample is the section (which is composed of various 
villages), it is natural to test whether the knowledge variables are clustered at the section level.  
Figure 3.2 shows the dendrogram for cluster analysis of the overall knowledge dimension 
variable with average linkage. The height of the graph represents the dissimilarity of knowledge 
within a section as compared to the other sections. From the dendrogram, only seven out of 268 
sections are statistically different from the other 261 sections, which means that the majority of the 
sections do not form any clusters. As a result, 97 percent (261/268) of the sample is not clustered or 
localized, so that we do not need to worry about localizing the correct solutions to knowledge 
questions. We further analyze single-dimension knowledge with dendrograms. Figure 3.3 shows 
that for each dimension, there are at most two sections that are different from the other sections, 
whose section IDs are labeled on the horizontal axis in each dendrogram.  
3.7 Methods and Intensity of extension agents’ Training of Farmers 
 
We now turn to the question of whether certain types of EA training methods work better in 
delivering information and increasing farmers’ overall knowledge of pit planting. Table 3.12 
shows the regression models of the knowledge dimension on different delivery methods. Those 
methods include face-to-face individual visits from the EAs, short-term training, listening to radio, 
watching TV, and village meetings. We use information on how the farmers receive information 
about pit planting to construct the method variables. The results show that only face-to-face 
individual visits and group/village meetings with government EAs have positive and significant 
effects on farmers’ overall knowledge. This means that compared with listening to the radio and 
watching TV about pit planting, the more intensive and personal sessions such as face-to-face 
visits and village/group meetings are more effective information delivery methods. The effects of 
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short-term training are not significant, which aligns with the results in Kondylis, Mueller, and Zhu 
(2017). This could be because during individual visits and group meetings, where farmers are 
more engaged, farmers and EAs can pay more attention to details, which does much to ensure 
successful implementations of the technology. Surprisingly, none of the farmers who were aware 
of pit planting reported that they had received advice through a farm demonstration, which is 
considered to be one of the major strategies in disseminating the technology. Potentially, 
Malawian farmers’ lack of awareness about pit planting could be because of insufficient farm 
demonstration of the technology.  
3.8 Extension, Awareness, Knowledge and Adoption 
 
We have analyzed information transmission along the knowledge chain, looking at the types 
of failures that result in the loss of information, as well as considering the localization of 
knowledge. Now we would like to show the relationship among extension services, awareness of 
pit planting, knowledge of pit planting and adoption of pit planting. Specifically, we want to first 
test if receiving extension services would lead to more awareness, which is considered as the 
change from having absolutely no knowledge, or the existence of the technology to having some 
degree of knowledge. Then we test if receiving extension services is significant in explaining 
adoption. Finally, we test whether our measure of knowledge is important in explaining adoption 
behavior. If the knowledge variable has no significant impact on adoption behavior, then efforts to 
improve information transmission might not result in satisfactory behavioral change. Table 3.13 
shows the regressions of the binary pit planting awareness and adoption variables. Specification 
(1) shows the relationship between receiving extension services and awareness of the pit planting 
technology. The results indicate a strong positive relationship between receiving advice from 
government and NGO extension services and awareness of pit planting. But receiving services 
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from private extension is negatively associated with awareness of pit planting. This could be 
because private extension tends to discourage pit planting usage. These observations complement 
our previous analysis of extension on knowledge variable, because we only collect knowledge data 
from those who are aware of pit planting. However, in specification (2), we find that receiving 
advice during an extension provider’s visit does not affect adoption behavior. Attending a farmer 
cluster or visiting an agricultural training center significantly increases the likelihood of adopting 
the technology. Having more adults in the household is also positively associated with 
adoption—possibly because the number of adults in the household serves as a proxy for labor 
supply. Especially for pit planting, which is considered to be labor intensive, availability of family 
labor or hired labor, or both, is an important factor for adoption. The more organizations or 
associations the farmers attend, the more likely it is that they will adopt the technology.  
Specification (3) includes our measure of knowledge, that is, the knowledge dimension 
variable. We see that the knowledge variable is positive and significant in explaining adoption 
behavior, and the magnitude tends to be larger than those of the extension service variables. There 
could be two explanations for this observation. First, receiving extension services is important in 
determining the farmers’ adoption behavior, but the effect operates only through the knowledge 
variable. In other words, after controlling for farmers’ knowledge, the extension services variables 
do not provide additional information in explaining adoption. Second, it is possible that extension 
services have effects other than teaching farming techniques, such as urging and persuading 
farmers to adopt the technologies, but these other effects are not as important as farmers’ 
knowledge in contributing to adopt a technology. Although we cannot determine the causal impact 
of extension services on adoption, the observation here suggests that the knowledge variable could 
serve as an important subjective measure of knowledge, which explains well adoption behavior. 
 96 
Specifications (4) and (5) use the sample with LFs only, and the results are consistent with 
those in (2) and (3). The analysis here confirms our understanding that receiving advice or 
observing the technology during an EA’s demonstration might not be sufficient in helping farmers 
adopt the technology. Instead, understanding the technology is more important in the adoption 
process. This could be because when farmers have a better understanding of the technology, they 
receive more of its benefits, which contributes to continued adoption. 
Another observation that can help confirm the importance of knowledge in determining adoption 
is the distribution of pit planting adoption among different plots in the same household. If farmers’ 
knowledge is an important determinant of adoption, then farmers would tend to adopt on all of 
their plots. If other variables such as labor are more important than knowledge, then we would see 
adoption taking place only on part of farmers’ plots. However, the actual adoption of pit planting 
might be contingent on crop type. To control for potential crop-type effects, we restrict analysis to 
the plots with only maize, which is the major crop in Malawi. We find that out of 641 households 
that own 876 maize plots, 467 (72.3 percent of 641) households own only one maize plot, and all 
of those households have adopted pit planting. For the other 174 households that own multiple 
maize plots, 165 (94.8 percent of 174) have adopted pit planting on all of their maize plots. This 




In this research, we assess the efficiency of information transmission along the lab-to-field 
knowledge chain. Because LFs have become an important modality of transmitting knowledge to 
farmers in the Malawi context, we link the EAs, LFs, and OFs within their respective geographical 
section. Using the complete knowledge chain, we find that most information loss occurs at the 
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EA-LF link. We further unpack information loss, asking whether it is likely due to teaching failure 
(EA side) or learning failure (LF and OF side). Further regression analyses with the impact of 
extension on overall and single-dimension knowledge show that the information failure between 
EAs and LFs is potentially caused by teaching failures of EAs, who might not emphasize all of the 
important details for a successful implementation of pit planting. Some EAs even have a negative 
effect on farmers’ knowledge. However, when we consider the other farmers, the analysis reveals 
the limited attention of farmers in learning a multidimensional technology.  
Because we find that the knowledge variable better explains adoption behavior than extension 
service variables, we argue that receiving advice itself might not be enough to induce adoption, 
and that a better understanding of the technology and more intensive training and learning is more 
important in altering behavior. Even though most of the results in this analysis are descriptive and 
lack a standard causal inference, they raise questions about the efficiency of the LF modality in 
transmitting information and about the teaching methods employed by the extension services.  
This research has some straightforward policy implications. Governmental and 
nongovernmental extension providers should focus on modifying the LFs’ training programs. We 
suggest that during demonstrations, visits, group meetings, and other training sessions, EAs 
explicitly point out the importance of fully understanding a complicated technology. A low-cost, 
one-page handout or a short video for farmers with a checklist of important details of the 
technology might be useful in reducing the loss of information. In terms of the extension method 
or approach, our evidence suggests that more intensive and face-to-face interactions (face-to-face 
visits and group/village meetings) improve knowledge scores and reduce information loss. In the 
case of complex technologies, follow-ups and continued mentoring by EAs of both LFs and OFs 
are necessary. EAs report that it will take two to three years on average of continuous teaching and 
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follow-up by EAs and intensive learning by farmers for farmers to master and adopt the 
technology. As more and more technology comes in the form of packages of multiple techniques, 
the adoption of a package might not only depend on the complementarity of the techniques (Ward 
et al. 2016) but could also be limited by farmers’ knowledge. This makes fixing information 
inefficiencies along the knowledge chain a priority among the tasks of promoting agricultural 
technologies. 
Further analysis is necessary to better purge away the other behavioral alternatives in the 
information transmission process. Because this research is embedded in the early phase of the 
more comprehensive extension service research project led by IFPRI, we would be able to revisit 
the question when more data become available, such as a panel dataset where time-invariant fixed 


























3.10 Figures and Tables 
 
 
Figure 3.1 Knowledge distribution of extension agents, lead farmers, and other farmers 
 
Source:  Data are extracted from Malawi household survey (IFPRI 2016), and extension service 
provider survey (IFPRI 2017). 
Note:  The knowledge dimension variable is defined as the number of questions answered 






















Figure 3.2 Dendrogram for cluster analysis of overall knowledge dimension variable with average 
linkage 
 
Source:  Data are extracted from Malawi household survey (IFPRI 2016).  
Note:  Analysis is based on the knowledge dimension variable, which is defined as the number 
of questions answered correctly about pit planting. Horizontal axis provides section ID numbers. 

































Figure 3.3 Continued 
 
Source:  Data are extracted from Malawi household survey (IFPRI 2016).  
Note:  Analysis is based on the binary knowledge variable for each knowledge dimension, and each 
graph shows cluster analysis on one of six dimensions of knowledge. Horizontal axis provides section ID 
numbers. The rest of the sections have a dissimilarity measure of zero and are omitted from the graphs. 
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Table 3.1 Summary statistics 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
  3.79 1.13 0 6 
Binary knowledge variables for each dimension (falls in correct range = 1) 
1st dimension (diameter of pits) 0.84 0.36 0 1 
2nd dimension (depth of pits) 0.22 0.42 0 1 
3rd dimension (distance between pits) 0.38 0.49 0 1 
4th dimension (whether use fertilizer) 0.85 0.36 0 1 
5th dimension (type of fertilizer) 0.94 0.23 0 1 
6th dimension (distribution of pits) 0.80 0.40 0 1 
Self-report adoption of pit planting 0.44 0.50 0 1 
Plot adoption of pit planting 0.18 0.38 0 1 
Receive pit planting advice from … (yes = 1) 
    Any EA 0.14 0.35 0 1 
Government EA 0.13 0.33 0 1 
Private EA 0.01 0.10 0 1 
Nongovernmental organization EA 0.05 0.23 0 1 
Farm organization EA 0.01 0.08 0 1 
Number of months with abnormal rainfall 3.00 0.97 1 4 
Participation in activities … (yes = 1) 
    Attend farmer cluster 0.08 0.28 0 1 
Attend farm demonstrations 0.22 0.41 0 1 
Use print materials on agriculture 0.03 0.18 0 1 
Use library or resource centers 0.00 0.06 0 1 
Attend agricultural training centers 0.04 0.20 0 1 
Use radio 0.29 0.45 0 1 
Attend listening clubs 0.02 0.13 0 1 
Use TV 0.01 0.11 0 1 
Use phone/SMS 0.05 0.21 0 1 
Attend VAC 0.17 0.37 0 1 
Attend GAC 0.11 0.31 0 1 
Attend meetings in the community 0.34 0.47 0 1 
Receive information from mobile vans 0.03 0.17 0 1 
Total livestock units 17.92 22.28 0 227 
Household asset value (million MWK) 1.36 45.40 0 1.60E+03 
Landholding (acres) 3.16 2.84 0 33.0014 
Education (years) 6.32 3.93 0 15 
Number of adults in the household 2.25 0.93 0 13 
North 0.10 0.30 0 1 
Central  0.56 0.50 0 1 
South 0.34 0.47 0 1 
Quintile of distance to roads 2.85 1.44 1 5 
Connectivity index -0.25 0.90 -2.157 2.78976 
Number of people in network 1.40 1.56 0 30 
Number of associations attended 0.55 0.85 0 7 
Number of observations 1,243 
Source:  Data are extracted from Malawi household survey (IFPRI 2016). 
Note:  Knowledge dimension is the number of questions answered correctly; landholding is in acres; connectivity index is 
constructed with Principal Component analysis on the frequency of listening to radio, watching TV, going to the nearest town, 
talking on the phone, and going to the nearest market. EA = extension agent; SMS = short message service; VAC = village 








Table 3.2 T-test of EA and LF knowledge 
Source:  Data are extracted from Malawi household survey (IFPRI 2016), and extension service 
provider survey (IFPRI 2017). 
Note:  The partial information chain is constructed by merging EAs and LFs by their operational 
area. The knowledge dimension variable is the number of questions answered correctly about pit 







Table 3.3 T-test of LF and other farmer knowledge 
Source:  Data are extracted from Malawi household survey (IFPRI 2016), and extension service 
provider survey (IFPRI 2017). 
Note:  The partial information chain is constructed by merging LFs and other farmers by their 
operational area. The knowledge dimension variable is the number of questions answered 











Source:  Data are extracted from Malawi household survey (IFPRI 2016), and extension service 
provider survey (IFPRI 2017). 
Note:  Complete information chain is constructed by merging EA and LF by their operational 
area. The knowledge dimension variable is the number of questions answered correctly about pit 




  Mean Std. Err. 95% CI 
Knowledge dimension of EA 4.35 0.07 4.21 4.49 
Knowledge dimension of LF 3.79 0.09 3.59 3.98 
Difference 0.56*** 0.12 0.33 0.79 
  Mean Std. Err. 95% CI 
Knowledge dimension of LF 3.79 0.07 3.65 3.93 
Knowledge dimension of farmer 3.69 0.08 3.53 3.84 
Difference 0.11 0.09 -0.07 0.28 
  Mean Std. Err. 95% CI 
Difference EA-LF 0.56 0.12 0.33 0.79 
Difference LF-farmer 0.05 0.13 -0.2 0.3 










Source:  Data are extracted from Malawi household survey (IFPRI 2016), and extension service 
provider survey (IFPRI 2017). 
Note:  Complete information chain is constructed by merging EA and LF by their operational 
area. The knowledge dimension variable is the number of questions answered correctly about pit 



















Knowledge dimension of OF Mean Std. Err. 95% CI 
with direct contact of EA 3.62 0.08 3.46 3.78 
without direct contact of EA 4.53 0.23 4.03 5.02 
Difference -0.91*** 0.3 -1.49 -0.33 
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Table 3.6. Impact of extension services on knowledge dimension of all farmers 
Specifications (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
Ordinary least squares Poisson 
Variables Knowledge dimension Knowledge dimension 
Receive advice about pit planting from …                 








































































































































































































































Table 3.6 Continued 
Specifications (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
Ordinary least squares Poisson 















































































































































































































































Constant 3.752*** 3.903*** 3.729*** 3.874*** 1.322*** 1.276*** 1.316*** 1.270*** 
 
(0.034) (0.257) (0.034) (0.257) (0.015) (0.086) (0.016) (0.087) 
         
Observations 1,243 1,240 1,243 1,240 1,243 1,240 1,243 1,240 
Source:  Data are extracted from Malawi household survey (IFPRI 2016). 
Note:   The knowledge dimension variable is the number of questions answered correctly about pit planting. Standard errors in parentheses. EA = extension agent; NGO = 
nongovernmental organization; SMS = short message service; VAC = village agricultural committee; GAC = group agricultural committee; MWK = Malawian kwacha.  *** 
p < 0.01. ** p < 0.05. * p < 0.1. 
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Table 3.7 Impact of extension services on each dimension of pit planting knowledge 














Receive advice about pit planting from …          
Government EA 0.007 -0.006 0.120** 0.044 0.037 -0.030 
 
(0.037) (0.043) (0.050) (0.036) (0.025) (0.040) 
Private EA 0.112 0.243* -0.162 -0.093 -0.084 0.106 
 
(0.111) (0.128) (0.149) (0.109) (0.079) (0.122) 
NGO EA 0.036 -0.043 -0.006 0.007 -0.002 -0.021 
 
(0.052) (0.060) (0.070) (0.051) (0.035) (0.057) 
Farmer organization EA 0.123 -0.033 -0.117 0.136 0.065 0.085 
 
(0.133) (0.153) (0.178) (0.131) (0.087) (0.146) 
Number of months with 
abnormal rainfall -0.036* -0.029 -0.012 0.013 -0.006 -0.100*** 
 
(0.020) (0.023) (0.026) (0.019) (0.014) (0.021) 
Attend farmer cluster -0.060 0.007 -0.103* -0.023 -0.028 0.084* 
 
(0.043) (0.050) (0.057) (0.041) (0.028) (0.046) 
Attend farm demonstrations 0.002 -0.032 -0.003 0.008 0.012 -0.076** 
 
(0.030) (0.034) (0.040) (0.029) (0.020) (0.032) 
Use print materials on 
agriculture -0.072 0.027 -0.008 -0.069 0.000 0.164** 
 
(0.067) (0.079) (0.090) (0.061) (0.044) (0.068) 
Use library or resource centers 0.141 0.587*** -0.150 0.125 -0.248** -0.078 
 
(0.188) (0.217) (0.252) (0.185) (0.122) (0.206) 
Attend agricultural training 
centers -0.074 -0.131* -0.056 -0.058 0.008 -0.080 
 
(0.059) (0.068) (0.079) (0.057) (0.040) (0.064) 
Use radio 0.002 0.034 0.022 0.027 -0.049*** 0.076*** 
 
(0.025) (0.029) (0.034) (0.024) (0.017) (0.027) 
Attend listening clubs 0.023 0.017 -0.090 -0.145* -0.003 -0.013 
 
(0.085) (0.098) (0.114) (0.084) (0.059) (0.093) 
Use TV -0.056 -0.120 -0.087 0.030 -0.085 0.035 
 
(0.103) (0.123) (0.138) (0.098) (0.070) (0.109) 
Use phone/SMS -0.007 0.103 0.060 -0.063 0.075** -0.013 
 
(0.056) (0.065) (0.075) (0.053) (0.037) (0.058) 
Attend VAC 0.001 -0.034 -0.031 0.024 -0.030 0.037 
 
(0.039) (0.045) (0.053) (0.038) (0.026) (0.042) 
Attend GAC 0.059 -0.018 0.045 0.044 0.020 0.028 
 
(0.047) (0.054) (0.063) (0.045) (0.032) (0.051) 
Attend meetings in the 
community 0.096*** -0.014 0.084** 0.082*** 0.032* -0.006 
 
(0.026) (0.030) (0.035) (0.025) (0.017) (0.027) 
Receive information from 
mobile vans -0.222*** 0.191** -0.102 0.037 -0.003 0.084 
 
(0.067) (0.079) (0.093) (0.063) (0.044) (0.070) 
Total livestock units -0.001* -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.001** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Household asset value (1,000 
MWK) 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000*** 0.000 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
 109 
Table 3.7 Continued 
Source:  Data are extracted from Malawi household survey (IFPRI 2016). 
Note:  Knowledge dimension variable is the number of questions answered correctly about pit planting. Standard errors in 
parentheses. EA = extension agent; NGO = nongovernmental organization; SMS = short message service; VAC = village 
































Landholding -0.002 0.004 -0.000 -0.013*** -0.005 0.000 
 
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) 
Household head education  
in years 0.006** 0.002 -0.002 0.005* 0.003 -0.003 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
Number of adults in the  
household 0.027** -0.019 -0.002 0.012 -0.012 0.021* 
 
(0.012) (0.014) (0.016) (0.011) (0.008) (0.013) 
North 0.005 
 




(0.068) (0.048) (0.035) (0.053) 
South -0.105*** 0.081* 0.041 -0.111*** -0.068** -0.096** 
 
(0.040) (0.046) (0.054) (0.038) (0.028) (0.042) 
Quintile of distance to roads 0.010 0.007 -0.014 0.007 0.011** -0.005 
 
(0.008) (0.009) (0.010) (0.007) (0.005) (0.008) 
Connectivity index -0.028** 0.022 -0.010 -0.010 0.008 0.004 
 
(0.014) (0.016) (0.018) (0.013) (0.009) (0.014) 
Number of people in network 0.003 -0.008 -0.002 -0.007 -0.005 -0.023*** 
 
(0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.007) (0.005) (0.007) 
Number of associations attended 0.011 0.001 0.070*** 0.028** 0.015 -0.013 
 
(0.014) (0.016) (0.018) (0.013) (0.009) (0.015) 
Constant 0.836*** 0.291*** 0.353*** 0.769*** 0.963*** 1.182*** 
 
(0.087) (0.082) (0.116) (0.082) (0.060) (0.091) 
       Observations 1,150 1,147 1,149 1,240 1,055 1,240 
R-squared 0.066 0.045 0.058 0.061 0.067 0.070 
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Table 3.8 Impact of extension services on each dimension of pit planting knowledge (probit) 














Receive advice about pit planting from …          
Government EA 0.042 -0.019 0.314** 0.272 0.462 -0.101 
 
(0.183) (0.155) (0.134) (0.202) (0.310) (0.149) 
Private EA 0.236 -0.164 -0.016 -0.014 0.131 -0.093 
 
(0.274) (0.221) (0.191) (0.277) (0.419) (0.210) 
NGO EA 
 
0.795* -0.426 -0.458 -0.972 0.252 
  
(0.421) (0.413) (0.541) (0.659) (0.463) 









Number of months with 
abnormal rainfall -0.168* -0.104 -0.036 0.072 -0.044 -0.361*** 
 
(0.087) (0.079) (0.071) (0.082) (0.133) (0.081) 
Attend farmer cluster -0.238 0.022 -0.295* -0.130 -0.222 0.319* 
 
(0.197) (0.183) (0.160) (0.206) (0.289) (0.184) 
Attend farm demonstrations -0.040 -0.129 -0.004 0.074 0.186 -0.256** 
 
(0.139) (0.124) (0.108) (0.140) (0.205) (0.116) 
Use print materials on 
agriculture -0.384 0.089 -0.011 -0.358 0.123 0.782** 
 
(0.287) (0.285) (0.245) (0.291) (0.538) (0.341) 










Attend agricultural training 
centers -0.371 -0.623** -0.138 -0.299 0.022 -0.261 
 
(0.275) (0.301) (0.217) (0.271) (0.447) (0.238) 
Use radio 0.020 0.127 0.060 0.148 -0.425*** 0.264** 
 
(0.114) (0.101) (0.091) (0.114) (0.148) (0.103) 
Attend listening clubs 0.318 0.013 -0.251 -0.756** -0.169 -0.061 
 
(0.516) (0.386) (0.310) (0.366) (0.584) (0.350) 
Use TV -0.235 -0.464 -0.230 -0.021 -0.438 0.200 
 
(0.423) (0.477) (0.381) (0.450) (0.503) (0.464) 




(0.272) (0.225) (0.204) (0.249) 
 
(0.237) 
Attend VAC 0.007 -0.123 -0.082 0.099 -0.239 0.126 
 
(0.183) (0.161) (0.142) (0.183) (0.237) (0.161) 
Attend GAC 0.360 -0.076 0.111 0.282 0.160 0.075 
 
(0.240) (0.199) (0.169) (0.234) (0.306) (0.192) 
Attend meetings in the 
community 0.457*** -0.046 0.227** 0.361*** 0.212 0.002 
 
(0.123) (0.105) (0.094) (0.119) (0.160) (0.106) 
Receive information from 
mobile vans -0.801*** 0.598** -0.294 0.133 -0.057 0.396 
 
(0.262) (0.249) (0.262) (0.304) (0.365) (0.318) 
Total livestock units -0.004 -0.002 0.003 -0.001 0.003 -0.004** 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
Household asset value 
(1,000 MWK) 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000** -0.000 0.000 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
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Table 3.8 Continued 














Landholding -0.011 0.014 -0.001 -0.065*** -0.036 0.003 
 
(0.020) (0.017) (0.015) (0.017) (0.025) (0.017) 
Household head education in 
years 0.026** 0.007 -0.004 0.017 0.040** -0.011 
 
(0.013) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.020) (0.011) 
Number of adults in the 
household 0.129** -0.072 -0.007 0.063 -0.090 0.078 
 
(0.059) (0.050) (0.043) (0.052) (0.077) (0.051) 
North 0.643*** -0.289* 0.258* 0.175 0.530* -0.415*** 
 
(0.214) (0.163) (0.145) (0.161) (0.294) (0.158) 
South 0.470*** -0.140 -0.110 0.423** 0.574** 0.337** 
 
(0.175) (0.161) (0.146) (0.166) (0.260) (0.162) 
Quintile of distance to roads 0.041 0.028 -0.038 0.025 0.110** -0.020 
 
(0.033) (0.030) (0.027) (0.032) (0.050) (0.030) 
Connectivity index -0.107* 0.065 -0.032 -0.009 0.071 0.015 
 
(0.059) (0.054) (0.051) (0.057) (0.085) (0.055) 
Number of people in network 0.016 -0.045 -0.004 -0.031 -0.043 -0.076** 
 
(0.036) (0.039) (0.027) (0.027) (0.032) (0.032) 
Number of associations 
attended 0.036 0.002 0.186*** 0.159** 0.153 -0.049 
 
(0.064) (0.057) (0.049) (0.069) (0.098) (0.053) 
Constant 0.571** -0.240 -0.266 0.226 1.135*** 1.893*** 
 
(0.282) (0.251) (0.226) (0.258) (0.411) (0.261) 
       
Observations 1,128 1,147 1,149 1,227 999 1,240 
Source:  Data are extracted from Malawi household survey (IFPR, 2016).  
Note:  Knowledge dimension variable is the number of questions answered correctly about pit planting. Standard errors in 
parentheses. EA = extension agent; NGO = nongovernmental organization; SMS = short message service; VAC = village 




















Table 3.9 Impact of extension services on knowledge dimension of lead farmers 
Specifications (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
Ordinary least squares Poisson 
Variables Knowledge dimension Knowledge dimension 
Receive advice about pit planting from …                 











































































































































































































































































Table 3.9 Continued 
Specifications (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
Ordinary least squares Poisson 
Variables Knowledge dimension Knowledge dimension 












































































































































































































Constant 3.987*** 4.650*** 4.000*** 4.613*** 1.383*** 1.406*** 1.386*** 1.406*** 
 
(0.064) (0.416) (0.068) (0.427) (0.032) (0.183) (0.034) (0.186) 
         Observations 283 283 283 283 283 283 283 283 
Source:  Data are extracted from Malawi household survey (IFPRI 2016). 
Note:  Knowledge dimension variable is the number of questions answered correctly about pit planting. Standard errors in parentheses. EA = extension agent; NGO = 
nongovernmental organization; SMS = short message service; VAC = village agricultural committee; GAC = group agricultural committee; MWK = Malawian kwacha. *** p < 0.01. 





Table 3.10 Impact of extension services on each dimension of pit planting knowledge, lead farmers only 
Specifications (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variables 1st dimension 2nd dimension 3rd dimension 4th dimension 5th dimension 6th dimension 
Receive advice about pit planting from …             
Government EA -0.012 -0.001 -0.026 -0.050 0.062 0.035 
 
(0.065) (0.061) (0.086) (0.054) (0.041) (0.069) 
Private EA 0.178 0.501** -0.443 -0.104 -0.357** -0.067 
 
(0.207) (0.194) (0.274) (0.173) (0.147) (0.220) 
NGO EA 0.013 -0.033 0.005 -0.006 -0.023 -0.170* 
 
(0.086) (0.081) (0.114) (0.072) (0.055) (0.091) 
Farmer organization EA 0.088 -0.269 0.564* 0.228 0.209 0.259 
 
(0.257) (0.241) (0.340) (0.215) (0.167) (0.272) 
Number of months with abnormal rainfall -0.038 -0.070* 0.007 0.012 -0.008 -0.085** 
 
(0.040) (0.038) (0.053) (0.033) (0.026) (0.042) 
Attend farmer cluster 0.021 0.056 -0.106 -0.060 -0.017 0.104 
 
(0.066) (0.062) (0.087) (0.054) (0.041) (0.069) 
Attend farm demonstrations -0.011 -0.028 -0.007 0.010 0.014 -0.012 
 
(0.057) (0.053) (0.076) (0.047) (0.036) (0.060) 
Use print materials on agriculture -0.073 -0.077 -0.045 -0.064 -0.023 0.080 
 
(0.095) (0.091) (0.127) (0.076) (0.059) (0.097) 
Use library or resource centers 0.093 0.513** -0.148 0.111 0.002 -0.086 
 
(0.239) (0.225) (0.317) (0.201) (0.146) (0.254) 
Attend agricultural training centers -0.024 -0.114 -0.092 -0.034 0.038 -0.054 
 
(0.075) (0.070) (0.099) (0.062) (0.048) (0.078) 
Use radio -0.042 0.045 -0.092 0.016 -0.036 0.128** 
 
(0.050) (0.047) (0.067) (0.042) (0.032) (0.053) 
Attend listening clubs -0.007 -0.031 0.065 -0.121 -0.058 -0.141 
 
(0.114) (0.107) (0.151) (0.096) (0.072) (0.121) 
Use TV 0.194 -0.072 -0.083 0.126 0.091 -0.064 
 
(0.301) (0.283) (0.399) (0.246) (0.180) (0.312) 
Use phone/SMS 0.012 0.050 -0.017 -0.051 0.095* -0.058 
 
(0.080) (0.076) (0.106) (0.066) (0.050) (0.083) 
Attend VAC -0.055 0.037 -0.069 0.033 -0.008 0.031 
 
(0.070) (0.066) (0.093) (0.059) (0.045) (0.075) 
Attend GAC 0.068 0.036 0.035 0.051 -0.035 0.019 
 
(0.077) (0.072) (0.102) (0.064) (0.048) (0.081) 
Attend meetings in the community 0.138*** 0.026 0.017 0.059 0.028 -0.018 
 
(0.053) (0.050) (0.070) (0.044) (0.034) (0.055) 
Receive information from mobile vans -0.248* 0.231* -0.294* 0.099 0.083 0.079 
 
(0.127) (0.119) (0.177) (0.102) (0.074) (0.129) 
Total livestock units -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.002** 0.001 0.000 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
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Table 3.10 Continued 
Specifications (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variables 1st dimension 2nd dimension 3rd dimension 4th dimension 5th dimension 6th dimension 
Household asset value (1,000 MWK) -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Landholding -0.001 -0.001 -0.004 -0.013** -0.004 -0.007 
 
(0.007) (0.006) (0.009) (0.006) (0.005) (0.007) 
Household head education in years -0.004 0.010 0.002 -0.007 0.013** 0.012 
 
(0.008) (0.007) (0.010) (0.006) (0.005) (0.008) 
Number of adults in the household 0.029 0.010 -0.007 -0.006 -0.012 0.006 
 












South -0.042 -0.010 -0.255** -0.206*** -0.010 0.094 
 
(0.082) (0.076) (0.109) (0.068) (0.053) (0.087) 
Quintile of distance to roads -0.015 -0.003 -0.022 0.003 0.017 0.014 
 
(0.016) (0.015) (0.022) (0.014) (0.011) (0.017) 
Connectivity index -0.045 0.016 0.042 -0.008 0.037 0.052 
 
(0.036) (0.034) (0.048) (0.030) (0.023) (0.038) 
Number of people in network 0.002 -0.003 -0.028* -0.007 -0.002 -0.018 
 
(0.011) (0.011) (0.015) (0.010) (0.007) (0.012) 
Number of associations attended 0.015 0.029 0.025 0.029 0.020 -0.018 
 
(0.024) (0.023) (0.032) (0.020) (0.015) (0.026) 
Constant 0.863*** 0.206 0.910*** 1.076*** 0.832*** 0.776*** 
 
(0.167) (0.180) (0.222) (0.139) (0.125) (0.176) 
       Observations 275 274 275 283 252 283 
R-squared 0.095 0.143 0.110 0.112 0.123 0.122 
Source:  Data are extracted from Malawi household survey (IFPRI 2016). 
Note:  Knowledge dimension variable is the number of questions answered correctly about pit planting. Standard errors in parentheses. EA = extension agent; NGO = 
nongovernmental organization; SMS = short message service; VAC = village agricultural committee; GAC = group agricultural committee; MWK = Malawian kwacha. *** p < 0.01. 










Table 3.11 Impact of extension services on each dimension of pit planting knowledge (probit), lead farmers only 














Receive advice about pit planting from …             
Government EA -0.012 -0.001 -0.026 -0.050 0.062 0.035 
 
(0.065) (0.061) (0.086) (0.054) (0.041) (0.069) 
Private EA 0.178 0.501** -0.443 -0.104 -0.357** -0.067 
 
(0.207) (0.194) (0.274) (0.173) (0.147) (0.220) 
NGO EA 0.013 -0.033 0.005 -0.006 -0.023 -0.170* 
 
(0.086) (0.081) (0.114) (0.072) (0.055) (0.091) 
Farmer organization EA 0.088 -0.269 0.564* 0.228 0.209 0.259 
 
(0.257) (0.241) (0.340) (0.215) (0.167) (0.272) 
Number of months with abnormal rainfall -0.038 -0.070* 0.007 0.012 -0.008 -0.085** 
 
(0.040) (0.038) (0.053) (0.033) (0.026) (0.042) 
Attend farmer cluster 0.021 0.056 -0.106 -0.060 -0.017 0.104 
 
(0.066) (0.062) (0.087) (0.054) (0.041) (0.069) 
Attend farm demonstrations -0.011 -0.028 -0.007 0.010 0.014 -0.012 
 
(0.057) (0.053) (0.076) (0.047) (0.036) (0.060) 
Use print materials on agriculture -0.073 -0.077 -0.045 -0.064 -0.023 0.080 
 
(0.095) (0.091) (0.127) (0.076) (0.059) (0.097) 
Use library or resource centers 0.093 0.513** -0.148 0.111 0.002 -0.086 
 
(0.239) (0.225) (0.317) (0.201) (0.146) (0.254) 
Attend agricultural training centers -0.024 -0.114 -0.092 -0.034 0.038 -0.054 
 
(0.075) (0.070) (0.099) (0.062) (0.048) (0.078) 
Use radio -0.042 0.045 -0.092 0.016 -0.036 0.128** 
 
(0.050) (0.047) (0.067) (0.042) (0.032) (0.053) 
Attend listening clubs -0.007 -0.031 0.065 -0.121 -0.058 -0.141 
 
(0.114) (0.107) (0.151) (0.096) (0.072) (0.121) 
Use TV 0.194 -0.072 -0.083 0.126 0.091 -0.064 
 
(0.301) (0.283) (0.399) (0.246) (0.180) (0.312) 
Use phone/SMS 0.012 0.050 -0.017 -0.051 0.095* -0.058 
 
(0.080) (0.076) (0.106) (0.066) (0.050) (0.083) 
Attend VAC -0.055 0.037 -0.069 0.033 -0.008 0.031 
 
(0.070) (0.066) (0.093) (0.059) (0.045) (0.075) 
Attend GAC 0.068 0.036 0.035 0.051 -0.035 0.019 
 
(0.077) (0.072) (0.102) (0.064) (0.048) (0.081) 
Attend meetings in the community 0.138*** 0.026 0.017 0.059 0.028 -0.018 
 
(0.053) (0.050) (0.070) (0.044) (0.034) (0.055) 
 117 
Table 3.11 Continued 














Receive information from mobile vans -0.248* 0.231* -0.294* 0.099 0.083 0.079 
 
(0.127) (0.119) (0.177) (0.102) (0.074) (0.129) 
Total livestock units -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.002** 0.001 0.000 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Household asset value (1,000 MWK) -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Landholding -0.001 -0.001 -0.004 -0.013** -0.004 -0.007 
 
(0.007) (0.006) (0.009) (0.006) (0.005) (0.007) 
Household head education in years -0.004 0.010 0.002 -0.007 0.013** 0.012 
 
(0.008) (0.007) (0.010) (0.006) (0.005) (0.008) 
Number of adults in the household 0.029 0.010 -0.007 -0.006 -0.012 0.006 
 












South -0.042 -0.010 -0.255** -0.206*** -0.010 0.094 
 
(0.082) (0.076) (0.109) (0.068) (0.053) (0.087) 
Quintile of distance to roads -0.015 -0.003 -0.022 0.003 0.017 0.014 
 
(0.016) (0.015) (0.022) (0.014) (0.011) (0.017) 
Connectivity index -0.045 0.016 0.042 -0.008 0.037 0.052 
 
(0.036) (0.034) (0.048) (0.030) (0.023) (0.038) 
Number of people in network 0.002 -0.003 -0.028* -0.007 -0.002 -0.018 
 
(0.011) (0.011) (0.015) (0.010) (0.007) (0.012) 
Number of associations attended 0.015 0.029 0.025 0.029 0.020 -0.018 
 
(0.024) (0.023) (0.032) (0.020) (0.015) (0.026) 
Constant 0.863*** 0.206 0.910*** 1.076*** 0.832*** 0.776*** 
 
(0.167) (0.180) (0.222) (0.139) (0.125) (0.176) 
       Observations 275 274 275 283 252 283 
R-squared 0.095 0.143 0.110 0.112 0.123 0.122 
Source:  Data are extracted from Malawi household survey (IFPRI 2016). 
Note: Knowledge dimension variable is the number of questions answered correctly about pit planting. Standard errors in parentheses. EA = extension agent; NGO = 
nongovernmental organization; SMS = short message service; VAC = village agricultural committee; GAC = group agricultural committee; MWK = Malawian kwacha. *** p < 0.01. 





Table 3.12 Impact of extension services on knowledge dimension by intensity of training 
Specifications (1) (2) 
Variables Knowledge dimension Knowledge dimension 
Receive advice from government EA through …     
Face-to-face, individual visits 0.491** 0.476* 
 
(0.246) (0.244) 
Short-term training -0.045 -0.228 
 
(0.329) (0.328) 
Radio -0.473 -0.610 
 
(0.423) (0.420) 
TV 1.242 1.301 
 
(1.126) (1.117) 
Village/group meeting 0.355** 0.321* 
 
(0.178) (0.179) 
Receive advice from nongovernment EA through … 
 Face-to-face, individual visits -0.078 -0.070 
 
(0.271) (0.269) 
Short-term training -0.823 -0.828 
 
(0.598) (0.592) 








Village/group meeting 0.040 0.101 
 
(0.280) (0.278) 




























































Constant 3.760*** 3.699*** 
 
(0.033) (0.210) 
   
Observations 1,243 1,243 
Source:  Data are extracted from Malawi household survey (IFPRI 2016).  
Note:  Knowledge dimension variable is the number of questions answered correctly about pit planting. Standard errors in 
parentheses. EA = extension agent; MWK = Malawian kwacha. *** p < 0.01. ** p < 0.05. * p < 0.1. 
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Table 3.13 Impact of knowledge dimension on adoption of pit planting  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
Awareness Adoption 
Variables All farmers All farmers Lead farmers 










Government EA 0.471*** 0.058 0.051 0.128 0.123 
 
(0.041) (0.057) (0.057) (0.100) (0.099) 
Private EA -0.343** -0.001 0.018 0.225 0.318 
 
(0.136) (0.187) (0.187) (0.333) (0.330) 
NGO EA 0.229*** 0.100 0.096 -0.023 -0.010 
 
(0.062) (0.084) (0.084) (0.152) (0.150) 
Farmer organization EA 0.168 0.089 0.073 0.106 -0.029 
 
(0.187) (0.233) (0.233) (0.397) (0.394) 
Number of months with abnormal rainfall 0.007 -0.028 -0.025 0.022 0.036 
 
(0.010) (0.025) (0.025) (0.051) (0.051) 
Attend farmer cluster 0.155*** 0.254*** 0.257*** 0.171** 0.175** 
 
(0.035) (0.056) (0.056) (0.084) (0.083) 
Attend farm demonstrations 0.108*** 0.052 0.053 0.090 0.091 
 
(0.021) (0.039) (0.039) (0.072) (0.071) 
Use print materials on agriculture -0.015 -0.033 -0.027 0.011 0.045 












(0.152) (0.251) (0.251) (0.308) (0.304) 
Attend agricultural training centers -0.029 0.224*** 0.237*** 0.173* 0.198** 
 
(0.041) (0.077) (0.077) (0.093) (0.092) 
Use radio 0.009 0.008 0.005 0.018 0.014 
 
(0.014) (0.032) (0.032) (0.064) (0.063) 
Attend listening clubs 0.009 -0.141 -0.133 -0.007 0.022 
 
(0.063) (0.113) (0.113) (0.146) (0.144) 
Use TV 0.070 -0.037 -0.033 0.322 0.267 
 
(0.071) (0.133) (0.133) (0.384) (0.379) 
Use phone/SMS -0.001 -0.083 -0.084 -0.071 -0.065 
 
(0.038) (0.071) (0.071) (0.101) (0.100) 
Attend VAC 0.085*** -0.034 -0.037 -0.052 -0.053 
 
(0.027) (0.051) (0.051) (0.091) (0.089) 
Attend GAC 0.057* -0.032 -0.038 -0.028 -0.051 
 
(0.033) (0.062) (0.062) (0.098) (0.097) 
Attend meetings in the community 0.139*** -0.028 -0.037 -0.065 -0.088 
 
(0.019) (0.033) (0.033) (0.066) (0.065) 
Receive information from mobile vans 0.017 0.112 0.113 0.040 0.033 
 
(0.015) (0.085) (0.085) (0.155) (0.153) 
Total livestock units 0.060 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 
(0.040) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Household asset value (1,000 MWK) 0.001*** 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Landholding -0.000 0.008 0.008 0.001 0.005 
 
(0.000) (0.005) (0.005) (0.009) (0.009) 
Household head education in years -0.002 0.002 0.002 0.007 0.006 
 
(0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.010) (0.010) 
Number of adults in the household 0.004*** 0.044*** 0.043*** 0.028 0.026 
 
(0.002) (0.015) (0.015) (0.025) (0.025) 
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Table 3.13 Continued.      
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Awareness Adoption 
Variables All farmers All farmers Lead farmers 
 
(0.006) (0.065) (0.065) (0.127) (0.125) 
South -0.078*** 0.104** 0.114** -0.127 -0.078 
 
(0.022) (0.051) (0.051) (0.104) (0.104) 
Quintile of distance to roads -0.005 -0.006 -0.006 -0.045** -0.044** 
 
(0.004) (0.010) (0.010) (0.021) (0.020) 
Connectivity index 0.001 -0.018 -0.018 0.016 0.006 
 
(0.007) (0.017) (0.017) (0.046) (0.045) 
Number of people in network 0.035*** 0.009 0.011 -0.002 0.004 
 
(0.005) (0.009) (0.009) (0.015) (0.015) 
Number of associations attended 0.028*** 0.054*** 0.049*** -0.032 -0.045 
 
(0.009) (0.018) (0.018) (0.031) (0.031) 
Constant 0.161*** 0.269** 0.155 0.657*** 0.242 
 
(0.037) (0.112) (0.121) (0.211) (0.251) 
 
 
    Observations 4,958 1,240 1,240 283 283 
R-squared 0.185 0.101 0.105 0.104 0.134 
Source:  Data are extracted from Malawi household survey (IFPRI 2016).  
Note:  Knowledge dimension variable is the number of questions answered correctly about pit planting. Standard errors in 
parentheses. EA = extension agent; NGO = nongovernmental organization; SMS = short message service; VAC = village 
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Appendix A. Supporting Material for Chapter One
Table A.1 The Impact of NRPP on Transfers, Individual Fixed-effects Model
Dependent Variables NRPP effects
Probability of receiving transfers from children -0.002
(0.060)
Amount of transfers received from children -334.250
(1492.522)
Probability of transferring to children 0.209∗∗∗
(0.055)
Amount of transfers sent to children -445.629
(1857.262)
Observations 896
Rural sample from China Health and Retirement Longitudinal Study in 2011 and 2013.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
130
Table A.2 The Impact of NRPP on Transfers Received from Children, 2013 Only
Specifications Probability Amount
Non-parametric linear, no control -0.081∗∗ -214.332
(0.043) (2012.881)
Non-parametric linear, with control -0.082∗∗ -376.028
(0.043) (2017.199)
Quadratic, no control -0.026 -9334.232∗∗
(0.106) (4891.453)
Quadratic, with control -0.042 -9844.215∗∗
(0.108) (4969.391)
Control Mean 0.722 2983.994
Observations 2,103 2,103
Community FE yes yes
Rural sample from China Health and Retirement Longitudinal Study in 2013.
Nonparametric local linear regressions use triangular weights with a bandwidth of 6.
Fuzzy regression discontinuity estimation as in equation (13) and (14).
Bias-corrected, optimal band-width specification uses STATA rdrobust CCT option
Control variables include household size, education and income of both the
senders and receivers of the transfers, and sex ratio of the transfer senders.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A.3 The Impact of NRPP on Transfers Sent to Children, 2013 Only
Specifications Probability Amount
Non-parametric linear, no control -0.043 3642.955∗∗
(0.101) (1850.847)
Non-parametric linear, with control -0.062 3625.687∗∗
(0.099) (1878.286)
Quadratic, no control 0.129 9776.549∗
(0.307) (6135.746)
Quadratic, with control 0.101 9673.723∗
(0.304) (6282.956)
Control Mean 0.214 1353.564
Observations 2,103 2,103
Community FE yes yes
Rural sample from China Health and Retirement Longitudinal Study in 2013.
Nonparametric local linear regressions use triangular weights with a bandwidth of 6.
Fuzzy regression discontinuity estimation as in equation (13) and (14).
Bias-corrected, optimal band-width specification uses STATA rdrobust CCT option
Control variables include household size, education and income of both the
senders and receivers of the transfers, and sex ratio of the transfer senders.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Appendix B. Supporting Material for Chapter Two
Table B.1 shows the results of pooling 2011 and 2013 data and using the same model that
produces Table 2.3 and Table 2.7. Themagnitudes of the coefficients become smaller by pooling the
two years data, especially when there are no community fixed effects. This tendency of shrinking
coefficients close to zero could be because of the over-differencing effects of including many fixed
effects in the model. Except for the magnitudes of the coefficients, the estimates by pooling the two
years’ data show consistent findings as in the main results. It is also possible that the pension impact
becomes smaller overtime. More recent data is needed to examine pension impact on labor supply
in the long run. However, the main contribution of this study is to provide a retirement model of
farmers that allows differential response to pension. Data at the earlier stage of the pension program
implementation is more suitable to examine the initial behavioral changes of pensioners.
Table B.1 Impact of NRPP on Labor Supply, pooling 2011 and 2013 sample
Labor Supply
Whole sample Below Median Saving Above Median Saving
Specifications (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
NRPP receipt -0.078 -0.097∗ -0.119 -0.194∗∗ -0.061 -0.013
(0.054) (0.056) (0.091) (0.095) (0.081) (0.087)
Constant 0.846∗∗∗ 0.821∗∗∗ 0.951∗∗∗ 0.782∗∗∗ 0.613∗∗∗ 0.849∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.006) (0.011) (0.014) (0.032) (0.013)
Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
Community FE yes no yes no yes no
Observations 13731 13731 5938 5938 7793 7793
standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
All specifications are estimated with bandwidth 10.
NRPP receipt variable is instrumented by whether the person is sixty.
Controls include marital status, education and gender.
Figure B.1 shows the verification of identification assumption for regression discontinuity de-
sign. The results show that there are no discontinuity found in the land ownership, gender, marital
status and years of education around the pension cutoff age. This means that these control variables
will not cause the discontinuity in the variable of interest.
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Note: Data is from the China Health and Retirement Longitudinal Study in 2011 rural sample only. Results presented





Appendix C. Supporting Material for Chapter Three 
          
           Table C.1 Ranges and suggested answers for each knowledge dimension 
OF Continuous responses to … Mean Median Min 
     
 
How should the diameter of pits be … 29.15 30 2.5 
     
 
How deep should the pits be … 22.12 20 1 
     
 
What is the distance between the pits … 43.13 35 3 
     
 Categorical responses to … Category 1 Category 2 Category 3 
     
 
Do you use fertilizer in the pits … 16.16% (no) 83.84% (yes) 
     
 
What type of fertilizer should be used … 17.52% (organic) 5.96% (chemical) 76.52% (both) 
     
 
How should the pits distribute … 65.17% (straight) 15.02% (contour) 19.81% (scattered) 
Source:  Data are extracted from Malawi household survey (IFPRI 2016), and extension service provider survey (IFPRI 2017). 
Suggested answers are obtained from agronomic research (Anschütz et al. 2003; Malesu, Oduor, and Odhiambo 2007; UNEP 2012; 
WOCAT 2007). 
